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Ineffective corporate governance is a leading cause of financial crises. Ineffectual 
corporate governance is mainly due to the lack of prudential and efficient supervision, 
which is symptomatic of board composition and the selection criteria of board members. 
The purpose of this single case study was to explore the strategies that banking leaders 
used to identify board selection criteria that ensures effective governance. The sample 
consisted of 4 business leaders at a bank located in California that remained profitable 
and did not have losses during the recent recession. The conceptual framework used for 
the study was agency theory. The data sources were publicly available archival 
documents, semistructured interviews, member checking, and extant literature on the 
topic. Using methodological triangulation, 4 themes emerged from data analysis: select 
independent, experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members; 
recognize the importance of the choice of the CEO and other senior executives; 
acknowledge cooperation is key to sustainable growth; and promote integrity and ethics 
as key executive and board membership criteria. The application of the findings in this 
study may contribute to social change when banks operate under effective governance 
that can lead to improved well-being for all corporate stakeholders, including investors, 
employees, customers, and the bank’s community, through the continued employment 
and the economic stability of the community.  
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Ineffective corporate governance was the primary cause in well-publicized 
instances of excessive managerial risk-taking in the financial sector that led to the 
financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century (2007–2009), further adding to 
uncertainty about boards’ ability for oversight (McNulty, Florakis, & Ormrod, 2013).  
Effective monitoring is the ability (a) to be objective, (b) to comprehend the issues at 
hand, (c) to devote requisite time plus attention, and (d) to exert an individual’s self on 
behalf of shareholders (Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2014). The common cause of the 
subprime mortgage crisis and a resulting housing market crash was weak oversight, 
which led to excessive risk-taking and created incentives for banks to maximize short-
term profits by pushing subprime lending (Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013). 
Ineffective corporate governance manifests beyond the most recent financial crisis 
despite various governance factors and preventing practices; a typical organization loses 
about 5% of revenue each year to various forms of malfeasance (Yu, 2013). Malfeasance 
ranges from (a) the inadequacy of internal controls and lack of oversight, (b) fraudulent 
earnings reports, and (c) wrong action or inaction by executives and boards (Soltani, 
2014). Contemporary corporate governance issues include (a) inadequate information 
safety protocols leading to the breach of privacy data (Rai & Mar, 2014), (b) management 
of strategic partnerships (Thorne & Quinn, 2016) with prevention, and (c) management of 
corporate crises (Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Startling, 2014). 
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Background of the Problem 
Ineffective corporate governance was the primary cause in well-publicized 
instances of excessive managerial risk-taking in the financial sector that led to the 
financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century (2007-2009) further adding to 
uncertainty about boards’ ability for oversight (McNulty, Florakis, & Ormrod, 2013).  
Effective monitoring is the ability, (a) to be objective, (b) to comprehend the issues at 
hand, (c) to devote requisite time plus attention, and (d) to exert one’s self on behalf of 
shareholders (Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2014). The common cause of the subprime 
mortgage crisis and a resulting housing market crash was weak oversight, which led to 
excessive risk-taking and created incentives for banks to maximize short-term profits by 
pushing subprime lending (Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013). 
Ineffective corporate governance manifests beyond the most recent financial crisis 
despite various governance factors and preventing practices; a typical organization loses 
about 5% of revenue each year to various forms of malfeasance (Yu, 2013). Malfeasance 
ranges from (a) the inadequacy of internal controls and lack of oversight, (b) fraudulent 
earnings reports and (c) wrong action or inaction by executives and boards (Soltani, 
2014). Contemporary corporate governance issues include (a) inadequate information 
safety protocols leading to the breach of privacy data (Rai & Mar, 2014), (b) management 
of strategic partnerships (Thorne & Quinn, 2016), with prevention, and (c) management 




Corporate governance is a crucial success factor in a firm’s strategy and financial 
performance (Volonte, 2015), and when corporations' governance policies are weakly 
enforced, organizations can become inefficient and unprofitable (Starbuck, 2014).  
Corporate governance became a familiar term with the financial scandals and an 
exponential increase in corporate earnings restatements between 1997 and 2002, when 
financial markets lost more than $100 billion in market capitalization due to ineffective 
governance issues (Mande & Myungsoo, 2013). The general business problem was that 
some banking institutions lacked effective governance. The specific business problem 
was that some banking leaders lack strategies to identify board selection criteria that 
promote effective governance. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore strategies to 
improve board selection criteria that banking leaders use to promote effective 
governance. The targeted population comprised of banking leaders in one U.S. bank who 
demonstrated governance procedures for selecting board members and effective 
governance that ensured that the bank did not experience failures or government bailouts 
during the last financial crisis (2007–2009). The findings from this doctoral study have 
implications for positive social change, including economic and social benefits through 
profitable corporations to stakeholders, communities, and the economy. The social 
benefits could include enhancing self-worth when individuals remain employed in 
solvent corporations and promoting stable thriving families and communities. 
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Nature of the Study 
A qualitative approach was appropriate for this research study. Qualitative 
methods are appropriate for describing, decoding, and advancing the understanding of 
intertwined past, present, or future eclectic data (Hlady-Rispal & Jouison-Laffitte, 2014). 
Qualitative methods with open-ended research questions are appropriate for gathering 
comprehensive responses, identifying, and understanding different perspectives (Starr, 
2014). Therefore, a qualitative method was suitable for studying effective corporate 
governance. An alternative research method that I could have chosen was the quantitative 
research method, which is useful for examining relationships and differences among 
variables and testing hypotheses (see Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). A quantitative 
method was not suitable, as I did not focus this study on testing hypotheses or examining 
the relationships or differences among variables. Another possible method is mixed 
method research, which is an approach in which a researcher combines quantitative and 
qualitative methods in the same research inquiry (Starr, 2014). A mixed method is a 
viable option when a research question is multifaceted and complex and the researcher 
cannot address the problem by one approach adequately (Caruth, 2013). However, 
because semistructured interview questions are best for answering the research question 
in this study with comprehensive responses (see Dresch, Lacerda, & Cauchick Miguel, 
2015), I employed the qualitative method. 
I conducted a single case study to address the purpose of this research. Qualitative 
case studies involve the study of a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting 
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(Yin, 2014). Therefore, a case study was appropriate for understanding corporate 
governance issues from the participants’ ideas and perspectives.  
There are several qualitative research designs, including phenomenology, 
ethnography, and case studies. The phenomenological approach involves collecting the 
lived experiences of individuals with particular characteristics who have experienced a 
common phenomenon (Ryan, Lauchlan, Rooney, Hollins Martins, & Gray, 2014). The 
focus of this study was on efficacious strategies and processes for selecting board 
members; hence, phenomenology would not have been an appropriate design. In 
ethnographical research, the researcher is an active and engaged participant who observes 
and describes the attributes of a culture-sharing group (Lopez-Dicastillo & Belintxon, 
2014). An ethnography would be unsuitable to studying utilizing corporate governance 
because it does not involve exploring a cultural phenomenon. As both phenomenology 
and ethnography were unsuitable designs for this study, the case study design was the 
most appropriate to address the research question. 
Research Question 
I developed one overarching research question to guide this study: What strategies 
do banking leaders use to identify board selection criteria to ensure effective governance? 
Interview Questions 
I used the following semistructured interview questions to promote exploration of 
corporate governance from the perspective of business leaders in one U.S. bank that 
demonstrated effective corporate governance and did not experience failures or 
government bailouts during the last financial crisis. 
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1. What are the functions of your board of directors? 
2. What are the characteristics of an effective corporate board? 
3. What are your board selection criteria? 
4. What is the bank’s process for selecting and appointing board members? 
5. How has your board demonstrated effective corporate governance? 
6. In what ways have your selection criteria demonstrated that they promote 
effective board members? 
7. What are other selection strategies that you have used for promoting effective 
corporate governance? 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study was agency theory. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) developed agency theory to explain the inherent conflict of interest between 
executives and corporate board members. Key propositions of the theory involve conflict 
in corporate leadership characterized by the short-term profit orientation of some CEOs, 
versus the long-term viability strategies of the corporation (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Such 
conflict is more prevalent when there is a dichotomy in the strategies required for short-
term and long-term success and when the CEO role is combined with the chair of the 
board of directors (Sarpal, 2014).  
In agency theory, the interests of the CEO and shareholders sometimes diverge 
(e.g., maximizing short term results versus engaging in long term strategies), which can 
result in significant costs and inefficiencies ultimately borne by society (Bosse & 
Phillips, 2016). The central premise of agency theory is that managers and shareholders 
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have different access to firm-specific information, and managers as agents of 
shareholders/principals sometimes engage in self-serving behavior by making unethical 
or illegal decisions that may be detrimental to long-term corporate interests (Filatotchev 
& Nakajima, 2014). Executive largess, ineffective boards, distorted incentive schemes, 
accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management 
behavior, and lack of adequate oversight have been major causes of corporate 
malfeasance (Soltani, 2014). 
Krause and Semadeni (2014) noted that a key proposition of agency theory is that 
the CEO and board chair roles should be separated, because the CEO acting as his or her 
own monitor creates a conflict of interest. Remediating the agency conflict is a primary 
corporate governance issue. Sur et al. (2013) concluded that the composition of a board 
affects its functionality. A key agency theory premise is that diversity and board 
members’ independence from management is an important requirement for controlling 
management and protecting shareholder value (Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, & Labelle, 
2013). Hambrick et al. (2014) proposed to improve the monitoring capabilities of boards 
by increasing the proportion of independent directors, customarily defined as those who 
are not current or former company employees or otherwise linked to the company or its 
managers. 
Operational Definitions 
CEO duality: The assignment of CEO and board chair roles to one individual 
(Krause & Semadeni, 2014). 
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Groupthink: A psychological phenomenon that arises when a group of people 
cares more about avoiding conflict with each other than they do about the quality of the 
decision they are making (Carver, 2013). 
Incentive contract: The attachment of performance targets to equity grants (such 
as stock options) to strengthen the association between executive compensation and firm 
performance (Abernethy, Yu Flora, & Bo, 2015). 
Leverage: The debt to equity ratio calculated as long-term debt divided by total 
equity at the beginning of the year (Malshe & Agarwal, 2015). 
Market capitalization: The valuation of a corporation based on the price of its 
shares and stocks. Market capitalization is a proxy for stock market quality (Hartono & 
Sulistiawan, 2014). 
Poison pill: The board of directors adopts poison pills, which are issued as a 
dividend to shareholders of common stock that is triggered when a potential acquirer 
accumulates a specified percentage of a target firm’s outstanding shares. The pill makes it 
difficult for the potential acquirer to complete a hostile takeover since it substantially 
increases the amount that the potential acquirer needs to pay (Rhee & Fiss, 2014). 
Risk: The probability of occurrence and the associated consequences of a set of 
hazardous scenarios (Gardoni & Murphy, 2014). 
Strategic agility: The ability of a company to adapt to the changes in the business 
environment or influence the environment; this ability determines its success in gaining 




Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are facts considered valid without additional investigation (Jansson, 
2013). The following assumptions were necessary for me to explore participants’ 
perceptions of board selection criteria and strategies that business leaders use to ensure 
effective governance. One assumption I held was that bank boards are critical to effective 
corporate governance. Another assumption was that the composition and attributes of 
bank boards are essential to the board’s effectiveness. I also assumed that the participants 
in this study were knowledgeable about the subject under study and were forthright and 
honest in the responses given to the interview questions. 
Limitations 
Limitations of a study are the factors that are beyond the control of the researcher 
(Greene et al., 2013). The results of this study were limited by the honesty of the 
participants in discussing the board selection criteria of their bank. Another limitation 
was the degree of forthrightness and candor of my participants in identifying and 
discussing all the effective corporate governance practices and strategies that have been 
critical to preventing corporate crises and resulting in the success of the bank. Banks are 
different in size, customer base, location, and market capitalization; the particular bank 
that I selected for my single case study may not be representative of all types of banks. 
Delimitations 
Delimitations refer to the bounds or scope of the study as defined by the 
researcher (Yin, 2014). Delimitations are boundaries that researchers establish before 
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commencing a study (Mitchell & Jolley, 2014). Corporate governance is a broad area of 
research that may have unduly widened the scope of this study beyond the business 
problem. This study was delimited to corporate governance in strategy formulation and 
execution. I chose a specific community bank located in the state of California in the 
United States with board selection criteria that promoted effective governance. 
I delimited this study to four participants who were knowledgeable about the 
bank’s successful board selection criteria. The participants included board members, 
selection committee members of the bank, and bank leaders who had been associated 
with the bank for at least 3 years. I selected only participants who had knowledge of the 
selection criteria for board members for the bank. The interview questions and the study 
were delimited to board selection criteria that are essential for effective corporate 
governance. 
Significance of the Study 
Sustainable success for many corporations results largely from decision-making 
and strategic corporate action by the CEO and the board of directors (Mowbray & Ingley, 
2013). Sustainable success may benefit corporate stakeholders, including investors, 
employees, customers, and the bank’s community. The potential significance of the 
findings from my study is that they may positively contribute to business practices that 




Contribution to Business Practice  
My recommendations from this study may be of value in determining board 
selection criteria that promote effective governance. Board composition that promotes 
effective governance could add significant shareholder value. Effective corporate 
governance is a determinant of investment decisions for many investors, including 
institutional investors with large portfolios in that good governance enables these 
institutions to protect their investments (Bushee, Carter, & Gerakos, 2014). The financial 
success of large or middle-size businesses and banks may result in economic growth and 
stability. The major contribution of this study for business practices is that of identifying 
and proposing board member selection criteria that may improve corporate governance, 
which could result in better business practices and performance. 
Implications for Social Change  
The findings from this study may encourage business leaders to adopt board 
selection strategies that promote corporate governance. Effective corporate governance 
strategies may lead to long-term shareholder value maximization and protect all 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and society as a whole 
(Bistrova, Titko, & Lace, 2014). The implications of this study for positive social change 
may include promoting improved individual welfare and living standards for all corporate 
stakeholders. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
My goal in undertaking this study was to explore board selection criteria and 
strategies that business leaders use to ensure effective governance. This review of 
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professional and academic literature pertained to corporate governance, strategic 
management, outstanding board member attributes, and board selection criteria. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2013) estimated the costs associated with the 
financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century at $10 trillion and attributed the 
cause to a lack of prudential supervision. Corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships among executives of a company, its board, its shareholders, other 
stakeholders, and the structure for achieving the objectives of the company (Dermine, 
2013). This review will be composed of five sections: (a) conceptual framework, (b) 
history of corporate governance problem, (c) governance initiatives and strategies, (d) 
current corporate governance challenges, and (e) board selection criteria. 
There is a wealth of information on corporate governance and board selection in 
journals, academic papers, essays, conference papers, texts, and books. I found articles on 
the composition of the boards, regulatory reforms, independent auditors, ethics, CEO 
requirements, executive compensation, and the role of discretion. I undertook a 
comprehensive and iterative search using the following key words and phrases: corporate 
governance, board of directors, strategic management, cyber security, strategic 
partnerships, corporate crisis, and corporate malfeasance. My literature search 
incorporated five databases: EBSCOhost, Business Source Complete, Hoover’s by Dun 
& Bradstreet, ABI/Inform, and ProQuest. I also sought information from several 
professional publications, print media, commercial, and government websites. 
My research strategy was to target relevant literature concerning corporate 
governance in academic journals. The primary sources of reviewed articles were from 
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scholarly articles. My search of databases and relevant items yielded a literature review 
that includes 190 sources, including four books and articles from 174 peer-reviewed 
journals, 165 of which were published within 5 years of the reference year of 2017. These 
165 sources represent 87% of the total sources reviewed, meeting the requirements of 
Walden University that at least 85% of literature review references being recent and peer-
reviewed items. 
Conceptual Framework  
Agency theory. Agency theory served as the conceptual framework for this 
doctoral study on effective corporate governance. According to agency theory, corporate 
governance involves two parties: the agent, typically the owners or executives who 
makes decisions, and the principals, who are shareholders of the organization (Conheady, 
McIlkenny, Opong, & Pignatel, 2015). Principals rely on the agent to act on their behalf; 
they expect company leaders to make competent decisions for the long-term profitability 
of the company (Berle & Means, 1991). Problems arise when the agent makes decisions 
that do not benefit the principals; from the principals’ perspective, these decisions benefit 
the agent’s own utility to the detriment of principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
divergence of interests are principal-agent problems, or simply, agency problems (Bosse 
& Phillips, 2016). Principal-agent or agency problems tend to spur shareholder calls for 
active boards to implement effective governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Corporate boards are expected to follow corporate governance mechanisms and 
are responsible for protecting shareholder interests and mitigating agency conflicts 
between shareholders and management (Sengupta & Zhang, 2015). Corporate 
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governance is a set of organizational practices designed to mitigate agency problems 
(Moradi, Aldin, Heyrani, & Iranmahd, 2012). Members of the board engage in corporate 
governance through the monitoring of executive activities, restraining managerial 
discretion, aligning CEO interests with those of the board and shareholders, and 
contributing to long-term shareholder value (Moradi et al., 2012). 
The primary role of the board is to monitor managerial performance and act in 
shareholders’ best interests by delivering a real return on investment (Crespi-Cladera & 
Pascual-Fuster, 2014). Improvements in governance reduce the likelihood of default and 
the cost of debt, enhancing financial performance (Frantz & Instefjord, 2013). Members 
of the board should be engaged in mitigating agency issues, which may include limiting 
the CEO’s activity and ability to make unilateral decisions (Crespi-Cladera & Pascual-
Fuster, 2014). 
Corporations that have extensive agency problems tend to have heavily-polarized 
boards and voting blocs of shareholders (Ayuso, Rodriguez, Garcia-Castro, & Arino, 
2014). Members of voting blocs may hold meetings independent of the board and 
company executives with the objective of making collective decisions that run counter to 
those of the board and CEO (Zhu, 2013). To remediate agency problems, researchers, 
such as Alexander, Bauguess, Bernile, Lee, and Marietta-Westberg (2013) and Mitra, 
Jaggi, and Hassain (2013), have recommended putting in place a strong and active audit 
committee. These audit committees are composed of board members who represent 
independence, diversity, financial knowledge, and vigilance (Krause, Semadeni, & 
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Cannella, 2013). Board members with these characteristics promote effective governance 
(Krause et al., 2013). 
The purpose of having a board of directors in place in an organization is to 
remediate agency problems and champion shareholders’ interests (Sur et al., 2013). An 
active audit committee enhances transparency and uncovers discrepancies (Krause et al., 
2013). Del Brio, Yoshikawa, Connelly, and Tan’s (2013) conclusions that board 
members must be qualified and capable of undertaking the tasks of monitoring 
executives’ corporate decisions and allocating resources strategically based on sound 
fiscal assessments are in line with Krause et al.’s (2013) findings. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), company executives and board members who adopt the tenets of 
agency theory follow sound governance strategies and realize strong financial results. 
Shareholders benefit from active boards that establish corporate fiscal balance, 
govern fairly, and disclose information fully and honestly (Kim & Ozdemir, 2014).  
Information asymmetry is a central problem that boards may remedy using agency theory 
(Tian, 2014). Information asymmetry is the imbalance in insight into firm strategies, 
challenges, operations, and critical issues that occur when managers, and not absentee 
owners, are in-charge of an organization (Conheady et al., 2015). When information 
asymmetry occurs, the board of directors should put in place the mechanisms for 
reducing or eliminating such information asymmetries to ensure shareholder confidence 
in the board (Conheady et al., 2015). 
The information is asymmetrical or unbalanced, as a typical CEO would have 
more internal firm knowledge than the shareholders (Conheady et al., 2015). Srinidhi, 
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Shaohua, and Firth (2014) wrote that board governance is a mechanism that alleviates 
agency problems and information asymmetry with reporting and disclosure. All leaders 
involved in corporate financial reporting, internal control, and corporate governance 
(boards of directors and audit committees) need to be alert to warning signs such as audit 
issues, financial restatements, elevated risk, and lack of disclosure (Franzel, 2014). The 
leaders, board of directors, and audit committees must respond appropriately to maintain 
integrity and the public trust as failure could threaten capital markets and economic well-
being (Franzel, 2014). 
Well-governed corporations have boards that are accountable, both fiscally and 
morally, to shareholders (Nohel, Guo, & Kruse, 2014). Economists attribute the global 
financial crisis that began in 2007 to the financial services and banking industry 
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015), largely because these organizations did not have boards 
that were accountable to shareholders. Responsible boards of directors take ownership of 
their role and actively oversee the activities of their firms (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013).  
Many previous fiscal crises, whether within individual organizations or in industries as a 
whole, resulted from a lack of prudent supervision at the board level (GAO, 2013). From 
the perspective of agency theory, the board of directors’ accountability to shareholders 
includes monitoring managerial opportunism and the potential exploitation of minority 
shareholders by majority shareholders (Berle & Means, 1991; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Not all boards of directors are independent outsiders (Hambrick et al., 2014).  
Board members can be internal members who are executives or employees of the 
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organization, or they can be external members who are not employees of the firm and are 
not under the control of the CEO (Hambrick et al., 2014). External or independent board 
members are appointed to be independent of the CEO (Crespi-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 
2014). Their appointments are based on their personal and professional qualities, which 
place them in a position to perform their duties without being influenced by any 
connection with the company, its shareholders, or its management (Crespi-Cladera & 
Pascual-Fuster, 2014).  
Investors prefer to invest in organizations with independent boards because these 
boards monitor executives, even if there is no definitive evidence of a positive association 
between board independence and firm performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Al-Najjar (2014) found a positive relationship between 
board of director independence, firm performance, and stock performance. According to 
agency theory, independent or outside board members act as monitors of company 
executives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), reducing executives’ abilities to act 
opportunistically and in their own best interest. In contrast, stewardship theory, when 
applied at the level of board members and CEO, creates synergies that positively 
influence organizational performance through collaboration within the mechanisms of 
trust, confidence, and strategic decision making (Mowbray & Ingley, 2013). Stewardship 
theory focuses on managerial and board members behavior and states that the behavior is 
pro-organizational and that the key motivating factor for managers and board members is 
getting satisfaction from a job well done (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015). 
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Board member duties include giving counsel to executives and maintaining civil, 
arm’s length relationships between the board and management (Zhang, 2013). Their 
control tasks involve monitoring and evaluating company and CEO performance to 
ensure corporate growth and protection of shareholders’ interest (Zhang, 2013). Board 
members must balance their duties of monitoring and giving counsel, being vigilant to 
ensure that quality of governance remains at the forefront of their attention so that 
investors’ interests are protected and public interests are safeguarded (Franzel, 2014). 
Board members have a responsibility to the organization to maintain confidential 
information to which they might be privy but also to filing honest, accurate, and complete 
reports (Kim & Ozdemir, 2014). Ramanan (2014) opined that having internal board 
members as opposed to external board members increases reporting integrity and that 
strong board oversight leads to, rather than inhibits, distorted reporting. Good corporate 
governance should incentivize the board members and executives to pursue objectives 
that benefit both the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring (Dermine, 2013). According to agency theory, candidates for board 
membership should be selected based on their ability to monitor management; because 
they are expected to monitor and guide executives, their independence from these 
executives is paramount (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Although scholars such as Al-Najjar (2014) and Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-
Fuster (2014) have expressed a preference for independent directors, Minton, Taillard, 
and Williamson (2014) advocated against them. Minton et al. claimed that independent 
directors with financial expertise encouraged the increased risk-taking behavior of 
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banking executives before the global financial crisis. According to Minton et al., an 
independent board with financial expertise was strongly negatively associated with bank 
performance during the crisis. The corporate governance model for banks relies on 
independent directors to ensure shareholders’ interests fuel decisions and steer executives 
away from conflicts (Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). Bushee et al. (2014) contended that 
investors prefer independent boards because their presence signals effective governance. 
In some firms, the CEO is also the chair of the board, while in other firms, the 
roles are kept separate and occupied by different persons. Agency theorists claim greater 
degrees of board independence result from the roles of CEO and chair of the board being 
distinct and separate—in other words, in organizations where CEO duality is not 
practiced (Sarpal, 2014). Regulators support organizations in which CEO duality is not 
practiced (Sarpal, 2014), and there are higher volumes of trade and higher earnings in 
firms with independent boards (Bar-Yosef & Prencipe, 2013). Although Sarpal (2014) 
was not in favor of CEO duality, some scholars have approved of the approach. For 
example, Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and Ryan (2014) claimed that the flow of information 
from the CEO to the board benefits from CEO duality.   
For public corporations in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (2010) and Securities and Exchange Commission rules 
mandate that boards inform shareholders about the board leadership structure and provide 
reasons for combining the roles of chair and CEO (GAO, 2013). Firms with independent 
chairs, majority voting, and a history of detailed disclosure of voting results in director 
elections tend to have a higher firm value (Tobin’s Q) or performance (return on assets 
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and stock returns) and lower financial risk (Baulkaran, 2014). The practice of splitting the 
roles of CEO and chairman or CEO and president in public corporations is becoming 
increasingly common in the United States, whether on a voluntary or a mandatory basis, 
to enhance corporate independence and transparency (Abels & Martelli, 2013). This 
increased separation of CEOs from board chairs has occurred alongside governance 
experts’ insistence that the separate leadership structure represents best practice for 
boards of directors (Krause et al., 2014). 
Board sizes vary among corporations. Boards with fewer than 10 members are 
regarded as small and boards with more than 10 members are considered large 
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). According to agency theory, a large board can be less 
efficient than a small board because of an increase in agency conflicts, inefficient 
communication, and operation costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Threshold analysis 
reveals that, following the financial crisis of the first decade of the 21st century, most 
investment banks opted for boards with fewer than 10 members, aiming to decrease 
agency conflicts from which predecessor large boards suffered (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 
2015). The resource dependency theory proposes that large boards are beneficial to firms 
because large boards are more diversified than small boards, and diversified board 
members provide greater expertise, wider access to resources, and higher quality advice 
than small boards (Switzer & Wang, 2013). While resource dependency theory favors 
large boards, agency theory suggests that large boards are not efficient because they are 
rife with coordination and communication problems and internal conflicts among 
directors (Switzer & Wang, 2013). 
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Several factors are associated with ineffective board decision making including 
size of boards (larger boards are more ineffective than smaller boards), board 
composition, the lack of specific industry expertise, and inadequate time commitment by 
directors (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014). While some scholars believe that board size has 
a negative impact on performance, consistent with the agency theory, particularly for 
banks with boards composed of more than 10 members (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015), 
Switzer and Wang (2013) found that large board size and less busy directors are 
associated with lower credit risk levels, but may not result in effective governance.  
Regardless of the board size, the attributes and capabilities of each board member are 
important to its functioning and effectiveness (Franzel, 2014). 
There are many other governance theories that apply to corporations. The various 
theories of corporate governance are polarized between a shareholder perspective and a 
stakeholder orientation (Ayuso et al., 2014). At one extreme, governance focuses 
exclusively on shareholders, while the other largely neglects financial and market 
performance interests of the firm (Ayuso et al., 2014). 
Stewardship theory. In addition to the popular agency theory, there are a number 
of other corporate governance theories. Stewardship theory is a contrasting concept to 
agency theory. According to stewardship theory, agents or CEOs are less likely to base 
their actions on self-interest and base them instead on serving the goals of the collective; 
in these cases, agents or CEOs act as stewards of the interests of their principals or 
shareholders (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
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The premise of stewardship theory is that managers left to their own devices will 
act as responsible stewards of the assets they control; the executive and board work 
cooperatively toward sustainable organization goals (Schillemans, 2013). Under 
stewardship theory, the board is expected to work openly and collaboratively with the 
CEO; the relationship between the two parties is trusting and cooperative rather than 
adversarial (McNulty et al., 2013). The key constructs underlying stewardship theory are 
that the board and management (a) have trust, (b) have mutual interests, (c) derive 
motivation from satisfaction in doing a good job, (d) value pro-organization behaviors, 
and (e) have no conflict (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015). 
In contrast to agency theory, the relationship between board and management, 
according to stewardship theory, is based on trust and working cooperatively on the same 
objectives (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In stewardship theory, financial factors are not 
the key motivators for employees, but in agency theory, the work motivators are 
predominantly financial (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015). The stewardship theory’s 
philosophy is based on McGregor’s Theory Y while the agency theory’s philosophy is 
based on McGregor’s Theory X (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015). As a result of trust, a 
CEO engenders unity in direction, command, and control when he or she also serves as 
the chair of the board of directors (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is yet another governance theory. 
Freeman developed the theory in 1994. This theory explains that corporations exist to 
represent the interests of different but interrelated stakeholders, all of which deserve 
strategic consideration (Moriarty, 2014). Stakeholders include (a) employees, (b) 
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managers, (c) shareholders, (d) financiers, (e) customers, (f) suppliers also communities, 
(g) special interest or environmental groups, (h) the media, and (i) society as a whole 
(Harrison, Freeman, & Sa de Abreau, 2015). The proposition is that corporations derive 
value through the consideration of all stakeholders and not just the consideration of 
shareholders (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
There are arguments supporting the utility of stakeholder theory. Bridoux and 
Stoelhorst (2013) concluded that organizations demonstrate improved firm performance 
when fairness is applied toward all stakeholders. Organizations in which stakeholder 
principles are upheld are likely to have strong stakeholder support and participation 
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013). Following stakeholder precepts is associated with good 
management and higher financial performance (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014). 
Stakeholder theory advocates for treating all stakeholders with fairness, honesty, 
and even generosity (Harrison et al., 2015). Stakeholder theorists propose that treating all 
stakeholders well creates a synergy (Tantalo & Priem, 2014). Moriarty (2014) stated 
stakeholder democracy was better for realizing the distributive goal of stakeholder theory, 
which is to balance all stakeholders’ interests, rather than the standard corporate 
governance arrangement that involves control of the board exclusively by shareholders. 
Trusteeship theory. Trusteeship theory (Balasubramanian, 2009) is another 
corporate governance theory. This model of governance promotes wealth creation, but is 
sensitive to the needs of society as a whole (Balasubramanian, 2009). According to 
trusteeship theory, the executive and board are keepers and trustees of the corporation, 
and with mounting public pressure arising from corporate governance scandals and 
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environmental concerns, the concept of the responsibility of companies is changing and 
broader corporate governance guidelines are gradually emerging (Pande & Ansari, 2014). 
Under trusteeship theory, the CEO, executive management, and board members 
behave transparently and conscientiously and act in the best interest of all shareholders 
and other stakeholders (Balasubramanian, 2009). The scale and magnitude of corporate 
frauds and scams in the 21st century in name of profit represented the absence of 
truteeship (Pande & Ansari, 2014). Societal trusteeship is fundamentally oriented toward 
the needs of external society and is represented by a willingness to leverage institutional 
resources to improve the human condition (Palmer, 2013). 
Trusteeship theory extends beyond stakeholder theory in that it addresses societal 
expectations and defines the role and responsibility of the organization to the social 
environment as a whole (Balasubramanian, 2009). Of particular concern in trusteeship 
theory is the wellbeing of those sections of the society that are disadvantaged (Pande & 
Ansari, 2014). The agency of trustees and greater diversity among trustees adds to the 
organization in terms of dynamism, creativity, innovation, boardroom decision-making 
processes, and quality of decisions (Sayce & Ozbilgin, 2014). Trusteeship theory is an 
ambitious concept along the lines of Utopian; achieving it requires a transformational 
change in people (Pande & Ansari, 2014). 
Summary. Agency theory was the appropriate conceptual framework for this 
doctoral study on utilizing corporate governance in strategy formulation and execution as 
it is focused on strengthening corporate governance. Other governance theories such as 
stewardship theory, (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994), and 
25 
 
trusteeship theory (Balasubramanian, 2009), depend on the premise that the collective 
interests of the CEO and shareholders are aligned. These theories assume the cooperative 
effort of the groups without the need to monitor executive activities. The lack of 
prudential supervision was the chief cause of corporate crises (GAO, 2013). Agency 
theory promotes the monitoring of managerial performance (Crespi-Cladera & Pascual-
Fuster, 2014), protects shareholder interests (Sengupta & Zhang, 2015), restrains 
discretion, aligns CEO interests with board and shareholders’ interests, and; therefore, 
contributes to long-term shareholder value (Moradi et al., 2012). 
History of Corporate Governance Problem 
Many financial crises have affected the economy of the United States. One such 
notable financial crisis occurred in the 20st century: the U.S. savings and loan crisis of 
the 1980s. Corporate governance history can be traced to the savings and loan crisis in 
which many financial institutions failed (Docking, 2012). More than 1,000 commercial 
banks and 939 savings and loans failed from 1980 through 1989 due to lax regulations, 
supervision, enforcement, and weak governance (Docking, 2012). 
Financial crises were not unique to the 20th century. Banking crises in the 21st 
century included the dot-com bubble crisis from 1997 to 2003 during which market 
euphoria propelled the stocks of technology firms beyond their market capitalization 
(Leone, Rice, Weber, & Willenborg, 2013). In essence, firms that had not declared profit 
earned a speculative valuation (Leone et al., 2013). Initial public offerings of many 
Internet companies received backing by venture capital firms and were underwritten by 
prestigious investment banks (Leone et al., 2013). In retrospect, the behavior of the 
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venture capitalists and investment bankers is nothing short of a failure in corporate 
governance (Leone et al., 2013). 
Accounting scandals and corporate governance failures increased in the early 
2000s (Henderson, 2013). WorldCom overstated its profits by $3.8 billion by improperly 
classifying expenses as investments (Darrat, Gray, Park, & Wu, 2016). Enron moved debt 
off its books and presented a misleading financial status (Darrat et al., 2016). Adelphia 
collapsed into bankruptcy after it disclosed $2.3 billion in off-balance-sheet debt in an 
egregious absence of ethics (Darrat et al., 2016). 
Corporate governance is meant to demonstrate awareness of the rules of 
operations made by the legal and the judicial system, as well as financial and labor 
markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Since the accounting scandals of the early 21st 
century, corporate governance issues have attracted increasing attention from researchers, 
practitioners, and policy makers (Darrat et al., 2016). The results of corporate governance 
can be measured in terms of the performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and 
treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Boards of directors are expected to complement the regulatory oversight of 
executives, but the boards of Enron, World Com, AIG, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, 
and many others that included industry and social luminaries failed to prevent excessive 
risk taking and the ultimate meltdowns and dissolutions of their firms (Henderson, 2013).  
The board of directors has authority, in most countries, to hire, fire, and set compensation 
for the CEO or the top manager, to set objectives for the firm, and to ask discerning 
questions (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014). Some authors believed the boards of many 
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corporations had hardly changed in decades, resulting in meetings that were almost 
entirely a matter of routine (Carver, 2013). 
Financial crisis (2007-2009). The same underlying causes of the U.S. savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s (e.g., lax regulations, poor supervision, minimal enforcement, 
and weak governance) were evident in the financial crisis of 2007–2009 (Docking, 2012).  
Governance of financial services institutions was at the center of the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis, during which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 
was placed under government conservatorship, and the lingering aftereffects of the worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression rippled around the world (Ferguson, 
2013). As an example of the lack of governance in financial services institutions, 
aggregate bank risk exposure to home equity loans was estimated to be 30% of the total 
residential mortgage exposure and approximately $750 billion (LaCour-Little, Yu, & 
Sun, 2014). 
Governing boards of many financial services institutions seemed unable to 
prevent the risk and ill-fated decisions that jeopardized their firms, devastated their 
investors, and helped precipitate a financial meltdown that evolved into a global 
recession through the creation of derivative securities and collateralized debt obligations 
(Travers, 2013). Towards the end of the 2000s, the U.S. financial industry entered a 
period of unprecedented instability; estimated losses attributed to subprime mortgages 
were between $400 and $500 billion (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). In response to the 
financial instability and risk to the global economy, the U.S. Congress, through the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program earmarked $475 billion to stabilize banking institutions, 
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restart credit markets, rescue the auto industry, stabilize AIG, and help struggling 
families avoid foreclosure (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016). 
International proposals for governance promote a shareholder-based view that 
governance should serve the shareholders and a stakeholder-based approach that 
corporate governance should serve both shareholders and stakeholders (Dermine, 2013).  
According to BASEL III, international initiatives complement country-based governance 
initiatives (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015). As a result of recurring financial crises attributed 
to lax corporate governance, bank leaders began adopting more responsible financial 
attitudes in compliance with the new regulatory framework and focusing on ethical 
practices (Paulet, Parnaudeau, & Relano, 2015). 
Governance Initiatives and Strategies 
Various factors contributed to corporate and financial crises. An important cause 
of corporate and bank crises is accounting malpractice (Soltani, 2014). Another common 
denominator reported in academic writings is executive largesse and lack of adequate 
oversight (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). To thwart recurring corporate and bank crises, 
there have been internal and external governance initiatives and additional calls for 
effective corporate governance and ethics (Alexander et al., 2013; Paulet et al., 2015).  
Some internal governance initiatives include (a) increasing the number of independent 
board members, (b) separating the roles of CEO and board chair, and (c) strong audit and 
nominating committee’s roles (Alexander et al., 2013). Examples of external governance 
initiatives include the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, Securities and Exchange Commission 
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(SEC) rules, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ regulations, and 
international corporate governance (Guo, Lach, & Mobbs, 2015). 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Governance failures and financial crises led to the 
enactment and promulgation of the SOX Act (Guo et al., 2015). The GAO identified and 
analyzed 919 restatements announced by 845 public companies from January 1, 1997, 
through June 30, 2002, that involved accounting irregularities resulting in material 
misstatements of financial statements and results (Franzel, 2014). In 2002, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed House Financial Service Committee Chairman Oxley’s 
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act and 
transmitted it to the Senate, where Senate Banking Committee Chairman Sarbanes 
submitted the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act (Franzel, 
2014). The resulting piece of legislation bears the names of its advocates, Sarbanes-
Oxley. In response to the SOX Act, corporate governance became the responsibility of 
corporations, banks, financial institutions, legislative bodies, and the U.S. government 
(Guo et al., 2015). 
The SOX Act took effect on July 30, 2002, with the intent of strengthening 
corporate governance and forestalling future corporate financial mismanagement 
(Alexander et al., 2013). As a result of the Act, Congress established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which required auditors of U.S. public 
companies to be subject to external and independent oversight; there would be no more 
self-regulated audits (PCAOB, 2017). During the Enron financial crisis, the external 
auditor of the firm, Arthur Andersen, continued to issue clean opinions as part of Enron 
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financial statements until both the auditor and leaders of the auditing firm were indicted 
by the Department of Justice in March 2002 for obstructing justice by inappropriately 
falsifying the Enron audit (Franzel, 2014). The SOX Act requires management to assess 
the effectiveness of its internal controls over financial reporting and to have an 
independent auditor attest to and report on the assessment made by management of the 
corporation (Alexander et al., 2013). 
In the era after promulgation of the SOX Act, U.S. financial institutions have been 
subjected to enhanced regulatory oversight, higher corporate scrutiny, higher penalties for 
financial misstatements, stringent audit standards, and rigorous audit quality inspections 
by the PCAOB (Mitra et al., 2013). Since 2002, when SOX became law, the bailout of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—two large government-sponsored enterprises—cost 
taxpayers over $150 billion (Bolotnyy, 2014). Congressional Budget Office estimates 
suggest that figure could double by 2019 (Bolotnyy, 2014). Mitra et al. (2013) reported 
that inadequate internal monitoring and the absence of effective internal controls is likely 
to result in even more agency problems. 
The SOX Act provided new rules, the requirements of which were inadequate to 
prevent the meltdown of financial institutions in 2008 (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014).  
There is a need to learn from the history of events that led to the passage of the SOX Act.  
According to Franzel (2014), government leaders should not allow the scale of recent 
financial crises to happen again, and stakeholders cannot afford to wait until a full-blown 
crisis is impending before making the necessary changes (Franzel, 2014). 
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SOX has had an effect on the financial reporting process of firms and investors’ 
expectation about the quality and reliability of reported financial information (Mitra et 
al., 2013). Nonetheless, inadequate internal monitoring still provides managers with the 
opportunity to make operating and financial reporting decisions that serve their interests 
at the cost of other stakeholders (Mitra et al., 2013). There is a large body of work on the 
role of the board in corporate governance, including its composition, role of gender, 
diversity, committees, shareholder rights and activism, executive compensation, and dual 
board structure (Docking, 2012; Hemphill & Laurence, 2014; Leone et al., 2013; Zeitoun, 
Osterloh, & Frey, 2014). Many scholarly articles have been published examining the 
relationship of corporate governance to financial performance, malfeasance, 
sustainability, and data security (Peters & Romi, 2015; Raelin & Bondy, 2013; Rai & 
Mar, 2014; Yu, 2013). There is synergy created when the board and CEO are engaged in 
strengthening proactive internal control and response governance (Schillemans, 2013). 
Much of the literature on corporate governance and the CEO’s role involve 
curtailing the CEO’s power and discretion. Filatotchev and Nakajima (2014), Sarpal 
(2014), and Srinidhi, Yan, and Tayi (2015) have promoted the separation of the role of 
the CEO and chairmanship of the board, CEO tenure, and limitations on strategic 
decision making. Few researchers offer practical approaches by which the board should 
work with the CEO to optimize the corporate goals and benefit all stakeholders. In 
essence, weak internal controls are believed to exacerbate managers’ aggressive risk-
taking behavior and their tendency to misreport financial information (Mitra et al., 2013). 
Voluntary and mandatory calls for governance reforms by regulatory authorities may be 
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equally effective, and high-quality corporate governance mitigates the diversion of 
managerial resources and improves firm values (Feng & Yue, 2013). 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Following 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was introduced in both the House and Senate by Financial Services 
Committee Chairman Barney Frank and Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris 
Dodd and became law on July 21, 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; Pope & Lee, 2013). The 
resulting piece of legislation bears the names of its advocates, Dodd-Frank Act.  
Economic and financial crises brought on by a breakdown in corporate ethics, laissez-
faire regulation, and limited liability in leveraged securitization amongst executives in 
many firms that included Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Goldman Sachs (Arce, 2013). 
The aim of the Dodd-Frank Act is to promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end too 
big to fail, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, and to protect consumers 
from abusive financial services practices (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). The five largest U.S. 
financial firms together have assets representing over half of Gross Domestic Product and 
one failure means systemic consequences (Hoenig, 2014). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) 
arising in the wake of the financial crisis, is a significant attempt to strengthen corporate 
governance by giving shareholders more control over executive pay and making the 




The Congressional summary to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose 
of Dodd-Frank Act is to, create a sound economic foundation to grow jobs, rein in Wall 
Street and big bonuses, end bailouts and too big to fail, and prevent another financial 
crisis (Arce, 2013). In drafting the Act, Congress believed that corporate governance 
arrangements before 2010 were weak or ineffective and more needed to be done to curb 
excess executive compensation. Before Dodd-Frank, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
addressed accounting and financial reforms in the wake of Enron and other corporate 
scandals (Conyon, 2014). 
Corporate governance had failed to rein in alleged corporate excess; boards and 
compensation committees were at the behest of CEOs and were not sufficiently 
safeguarding shareholder interests (Conyon, 2014). The canonical approach to the study 
of corporate governance in financial economics – agency theory – was created in 
recognition of the potential for opportunistic behavior in organizations characterized by 
principal–agent relationships (Arce, 2013). Dodd-Frank Act was designed to prevent the 
excessive risk-taking that led to the financial crisis by instituting reforms to create a more 
stable and responsible financial system that holds Wall Street accountable, discourages 
irresponsible financial risk-taking, and ends taxpayer-funded bailouts (Pope & Lee, 
2013). 
There has been complaints’ regarding increased compliance burden associated 
with the rules, increases in staffing required, additional training, and time allocation for 
regulatory compliance and updates to compliance systems (GAO, 2015). Title I of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was intended to address this issue by requiring the largest firms to map 
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out a bankruptcy strategy and should bankruptcy fail to work, Title H of Dodd-Frank 
would enable the government to nationalize and ultimately liquidate a failing systemic 
firm (Hoenig, 2014). Banks controlling assets of more than $10 billion have come to 
compose an overwhelming proportion of the U.S. economy, and those with more than a 
trillion dollars in assets dominate this group that even one of the largest five banks were 
to fail, it would devastate markets and the economy (Hoenig, 2014). 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), NYSE, and NASDAQ rules and 
regulations. In early 2002, as a response to several corporate scandals, the SEC called on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ to design regulatory changes that required boards of publicly 
listed companies to have a strict majority of independent outside directors (Schmeiser, 
2014). According to Volker, a well-respected economist, subprime mortgage costs 
exceeded a trillion dollars for 3 years, indicating it was ill advised to underestimate the 
importance of banking regulations (Feldstein, 2013). The 2013 amendments to the listing 
standards of the NYSE and NASDAQ, approved by the SEC, require the board to 
consider all factors relevant to determining whether the director has a relationship that is 
material to the director's ability to be independent from management (Lilienfeld, Cannon, 
Bennett, & Spera, 2013). NYSE listing standards Section 303 deals explicitly with 
corporate governance standards and specifies that boards must have a majority of 
independent directors (Conyon, 2014). 
A director is not independent if the director, or an immediate family member, has 
been an employee or received fees above a threshold in the last 3 years, is an employee of 
the auditor, or has had a financial relationship with the enterprise (Conyon, 2014). 
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Congress, the NYSE, and the NASDAQ enacted standards to improve the quality of 
corporate governance, but voluntary implementation of stronger corporate governance 
intended to improve the quality of disclosures and exceeding current corporate 
governance standards does not appear to have resulted in disclosures of superior quality 
(Harp, Myring, & Shortridge, 2014). These regulations reduced variations in the quality 
of financial information available to investors, but more control measures are needed to 
affect the kinds of changes needed in the corporate governance system (Harp et al., 
2014). 
Additional governance initiatives. Many governance initiatives have been 
designed to derive long-term benefits for businesses, banks, and corporations. Lessambo 
(2013) insisted that the primary role of the board is to monitor managerial performance 
and act in the best interest of shareholders by delivering a good return on investment.  
Bistrova et al. (2014) concluded that the role of the board is to enable effective corporate 
governance and strategies toward long-term shareholder value maximization and 
protection of all stakeholders. Zeitoun et al. (2014) contended that stratified sampling was 
best for appointing stakeholder representatives from among qualified candidates to the 
board and that this approach would enable the board to act autonomously in the interest 
of all. The stratified sampling method of selection should yield diverse board members 
that would generate wealth and maintain the sustainable competitive advantage for the 
firm (Zeitoun et al., 2014). 
Investors often clamor for stronger governance (Bushee et al., 2014). Venture 
firms that undertake investments for wealthy clients that are usually willing to take on 
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more risk (Garg, 2013). Garg (2013) noted that the boards of directors of venture firms 
typically include inside directors who have broad industry knowledge and outside board 
members who are informed and have professional obligations. Hedge funds are large 
investments made by a small group of wealthy and experienced investors (Bebchuk, 
Brav, & Jiang, 2013). Bebchuk et al. (2013) explained that activist hedge funds, 
motivated by their large financial stakes in firms, often successfully lobby for change at 
target companies. Firms with CEO duality, fewer directors nominated by the CEO, higher 
levels of outside director ownership, and pressure-resistant institutional shareholdings are 
more likely to repeal poison pills because they perceive governance mechanisms 
designed to limit managerial opportunism as complements to other mechanisms that 
minimize agency problems (Schepker & Oh, 2013). Poison pills are antitakeover 
provisions that carry potential agency costs; they are unnecessary when governance is 
strong (Rhee & Fiss, 2014). 
Audit committees are a type of board that has strong influence over operations, 
strategy, and firm performance (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). The goal of audit 
committees is to protect investors' interests by taking the lead on oversight responsibility 
in the areas of internal control, financial reporting, audit, and compliance, as decreed in 
Section 301 of the SOX Act (2002). Audit committees are responsible for appointing and 
supervising external auditors, reviewing financial reports, overseeing the effectiveness of 
the internal control structure of the organization, and overseeing of the whistleblower 
process (SOX Act, 2002). 
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Lin, Yeh, and Yang (2014) wrote that the performance of a board depends on how 
all members commit themselves to their supervisory responsibilities. The rising demand 
for independent directors resulting from regulations may have led to individual directors 
serving on multiple committees with negative governance consequences (Karim, Robin, 
& Suh, 2016). Board attendance decreases with multiple directorships, meeting 
frequency, and board size (Lin et al., 2014). 
There is concern for the impact of multiple directorships on board member 
effectiveness (Karim et al., 2016). Choudhary, Schloetzer, and Sturgess (2013) found that 
weak disclosure was the chief cause of financial malfeasance. To attain and sustain 
corporate financial performance, the firm must balance the wealth creating and wealth 
protecting roles of corporate governance (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2013; Raelin & 
Bondy, 2013). It is important to probe the factors in board processes that are critical to 
board effectiveness (Kakabadse et al., 2015). The number of directorships and mandatory 
meeting attendance should be considered when assessing the involvement of new 
directors. The combination of busy directors and a complex board can result in poor 
meeting attendance and ineffective corporate governance (Lin et al., 2014). 
Warren Buffett, an American business magnate, investor, and philanthropist, 
emphasized that performance should be the basis for executive pay decisions (Bowen, 
Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2014). Buffett recommended that investors should have a 
strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring goodwill, 
conditioned upon effective corporate governance and strategic management (Bowen et 
al., 2014). Ineffective corporate governance in large individual financial institutions may 
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have significant impact on the economy (Feldstein, 2013). Effective governance is 
typically characterized by higher quality disclosure and strong internal monitoring 
mechanisms (Bushee et al., 2014). 
To strengthen corporate governance, some have called for some measure of 
managerial governance in addition to board governance (Starbuck, 2014). In conjunction 
with board governance, it is important to improve managerial governance (Starbuck, 
2014) in light of past governance lapses. Many researchers perceive managerial 
governance as a form of self-governance that would not result in effective governance 
(Feldstein, 2013). Some academic writers support neo-liberalism, which advocates free 
markets and less regulations, self-regulation, financial liberation, and deregulation as 
stimulants of economic growth (Azkunaga, San-Jose, & Urionabarrenetxea, 2013). 
Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2014) cautioned that the contribution of a single 
financial institution to the deficiency of a system may be more relevant during periods of 
market stress. A widely-accepted view espoused by Bushee et al. (2014) is that effective 
corporate governance is a determinant of investment decisions for many investors and 
allows institutional investors, with large portfolios, to better perform their fiduciary 
responsibility to protect their investments. 
Since the 1980s, liberalization and deregulation were promoted and drove the 
financial entities in the direction of the free market where business leaders could act with 
greater freedom (Azkunaga et al., 2013). Past regulations seemed to have a strong impact 
initially, but faded as time passed; examples include those made by the SEC in 1933 and 
1934 following Black Tuesday, those of the late 1930s following the McKesson Robbins 
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scandal, after the equity funding and Continental Vending frauds during the 1970s, and 
more (Harp et al., 2014). Despite these regulations, corporate scandals continued to occur 
across varying industries throughout time (Harp et al., 2014). 
Strong corporate governance practices may have encouraged rather than 
constrained excessive risk-taking in the financial industry; financial institutions with 
stronger and more shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards of 
directors are associated with higher levels of systemic risk (Iqbal, Strobl, & Vähämaa, 
2015). Harp et al. (2014) concluded that compliance with regulations such as SOX in 
conjunction with strong ethics education can lead to effective governance for 
organizations that continue to produce high-quality disclosures. This behavior reflects the 
operating strategies and economic consequences of responsible firm activities (Harp et 
al., 2014). 
Robertson, Blevins, and Duffy (2013) engaged in the literature review of journal 
articles and found that the percentage that was ethics-related increased following the 
2007-2009 financial crisis and that most business leaders agree that there is a link 
between ethics, corporate social performance, and financial results. In essence, good 
ethics is a strategic advantage (Robertson et al., 2013). Pitelis (2013) concluded that for 
corporate governance to foster sustainable value creation, there should be an ethical 
dimension in managing the affairs of the company. Ultimately, ethics, internal 




Effective corporate governance is important for many reasons, including 
prevention of corporate malfeasance and development of organizational resilience in the 
face of governance difficulties such as cyber-attacks (Rai & Mar, 2014). All stakeholders 
may benefit from efficient management of banks and financial institutions (Dermine, 
2013). These benefits extend beyond profit maximization and the corporation; there are 
social ramifications for employees, shareholders, communities, and the nation as a whole 
(Bistrova et al., 2014). The three primary responsibilities that board members fill involve 
control or monitoring, affiliation with external organizations, and expert advice and 
guidance (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). These responsibilities are indicated in both the 
agency and stewardship theories. 
International corporate governance. There are two primary patterns of board 
structure. The unitary board system is commonly referred to as the Anglo-American 
system and the two-board system is commonly referred to as the German-Japanese 
system, under which the board of directors is responsible for running the company, while 
the supervisory board functions as a special monitoring unit (Lee, 2015). The dual board 
system features separation of the CEO and independent audit committee (Zeitoun et al., 
2014). Among the advantages of the dual board are the option to appoint stakeholder 
representatives to the board, improved monitoring, enhanced corporate governance, and a 
focus on the interest of all stakeholders (Zeitoun et al., 2014). Although the dual board 
approach promotes checks and balances, this style of corporate governance may be 
burdened by high board costs, communication problems, redundancies, and gaps in 
internal supervision (Lee, 2015). 
41 
 
There is continued effort to strengthen international corporate governance. The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB; 2015), established in 2009, is an international 
organization that coordinates various national financial agencies and standards-setting 
bodies at an international level. The FSB (2015) is committed to building resilient 
organizations. This international body is aimed at developing strong regulatory, 
supervisory, and stabilizing international financial markets (FSB, 2015). 
Basel III is an international regulatory accord that includes framework and reform 
stipulations for banks (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015). With a goal of promoting a more 
resilient banking sector, Basel III established rigorous data and quarterly reporting 
requirements, disclosure requirements, liquidity risk limits, leveraged ratio framework, 
bank supervision, and derivatives. Banks utilize short-term debt to invest in long-term 
assets and should enhance their internal governance structure with strong liquidity 
requirements, complemented by increased transparency (Ratnovski, 2013). Proponents of 
Basel’s regulations and requirements expected financial institutions would already have 
the governance structure to comply (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015). 
Trends in international governance also include an intensified effort to reform 
some important international organizations (Artuso & McLarney, 2015). One of the 
targets of international governance reform is the World Trade Organization, which deals 
with the rules of trade between nations (Ruggie, 2014). Another target is the International 
Labor Organization, which is committed to improving the living conditions of workers, 
workers’ rights, and fair compensation for workers (Artuso & McLarney, 2015). 
Lessambo (2013) wrote that the non-binding governance model of the Organization for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development’s 33 developed nations including the United 
States become binding. International regulatory framework and organizations are also 
concerned with legislation at the national level around the world, including in the United 
States, where the focus of efforts includes enhanced risk mitigation strategies such as the 
use of derivatives, securitization, credit risk transfer, and currency hedging (Ratnovski, 
2013). 
Some experts have continued to declare austerity as a necessary governance 
measure for international banks, especially in light of debt problems with Greece in 2010 
(Anderson & Minneman, 2014). Austerity, a deficit reduction strategy, is characterized 
by reduction in government expenditure, tax increases, reduction and elimination of 
entitlement programs, and privatization of public corporations; at the international level, 
austerity is often a requirement for financial bailout and a means of enhancing the 
repayment of public debt (Anderson & Minneman, 2014). Although touted as an effective 
measure to repay debt and attain solvency, austerity often has serious ramifications for 
the debtor nation which include lower rates of investment and a lower rate of 
entrepreneurship, which results in slower growth for the economy (Anderson & 
Minneman, 2014). 
Nongovernmental organizations, strong media complement investor activism, 
and board vigilance. When multinational enterprises collaborate with various 
stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations, in countries with fragile political 
frameworks and weak governance structure, there are positive philanthropic, legal, 
ethical, and governance ramifications (Kolk & Lenfant, 2013). The media are a powerful 
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conduit for institutional pressure and for effectively monitoring management (Luo & 
Salterio, 2014). As an external governance force on internal management policy, board 
vigilance and investor activism have an indirect impact on internal governance systems 
(Cohn & Rajan, 2013). This indirect impact often creates corporate value (Cohn & Rajan, 
2013). 
Current Corporate Governance Challenges 
Cyber security, corporate crises, and trade partnerships are among the current 
corporate governance challenges. The theft of information and the intentional disruption 
of online or digital processes are among the most prominent risks that business leaders 
face today (Brewer, 2015). A data breach can be costly in terms of both finances and 
reputations (Brewer, 2015), while corporate crises can have long-term adverse impacts on 
corporate integrity. 
Cyber security. Effective boards require capable, informed, strategic thinkers to 
engage in spirited discussions about strategic objectives to keep a corporation 
competitive (Vincent, 2015). Corporate data security is a current strategic and 
governance concern (Brewer, 2015). Recent cyber incursions have extended beyond retail 
and healthcare into many government agencies, energy grids, and critical infrastructure 
(Brewer, 2015). The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology defines critical 
infrastructures as the system and assets, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, economy, public health 
or safety, or any combination of those matters (Colesniuc, 2013). 
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In 2013, a breach of data at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
compromised the integrity of personal data from 4.2 million federal employees and 19.7 
applicants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016). Almost 66% of U.S. firms 
reported cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure control systems in recent years (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016). In January 2015, one of the largest health 
insurers in the country discovered a cyber-incursion that compromised the personally 
identifiable information of approximately 80 million people (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2016). 
Standards and guidelines for effective practices to address cyber risks 
recommended by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2014) are voluntary, even though 
effective corporate governance and strategic management are critical to the success of 
organizations and to national security. The advent of computer technology has given rise 
to a new type of crime: cybercrime (Strikwerda, 2014). Cybercrime includes the spread 
of computer viruses and e-fraud, and has facilitated the rapid propagation of criminal 
practices of espionage, sabotage, criminal syndicates, extortion, theft, subversion, and 
persecution on a global scale (Strikwerda, 2014). 
Security of private information and cyber security are important components of 
enterprise risk awareness (Brewer, 2015). Managers, executives, and the board of 
directors of organizations have risk oversight responsibilities to prevent cyber security 
breaches (Rai & Mar, 2014). The board should ensure periodic checks are conducted 
within the organization and know the risks of involvement with third-party service 
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providers (Rai & Mar, 2014). Corporate governance has many goals, including protecting 
against malfeasance and promoting the interests of stakeholders (Yu, 2013). 
Corporate governance could play a major role in enhancing data security and 
protection of private, confidential, secret, and proprietary information assets. Although 
enterprise mobility, including cloud services, may make an organization more productive, 
it also creates layers of complexity and risk, making information technology  
environments increasingly vulnerable while rendering firewalls and many anti-virus 
software programs incapable of preventing well-funded and organized cyber-attacks 
(Brewer, 2015). Peters and Romi (2015) found that that board committee member 
knowledge, expertise and capability is generally associated with increases in committee-
level performance, sustainability governance and contributions as a board member. A 
well-informed board should be invested in cyber security, remain aware of all cyber 
breach attempts against the organization, have regular briefings, ensure the organization 
maintains continued relationships with the local and national authorities responsible for 
taking action against cyber-attacks, while maintaining adequate cyber risk insurance (Rai 
& Mar, 2014). Cyber security constitutes a present and critical corporate governance 
imperative (Brewer, 2015). 
Robeson and O'Connor (2013) researched the effect of governance board on 
performance of firms in terms of innovation and noted that the board influences through 
strategic planning and funding that elevates corporate performance. Ensuring cyber 
resilience is a leadership responsibility (Strikwerda, 2014). Agency theory suggests that 
managers and investors have different preferences regarding security risk; investors can 
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diversify their capital over different firms to reduce firm-specific risk, but managers 
cannot diversify their investment of human capital in their firm (Srinidhi et al., 2015). As 
such, managers face greater risk of financial distress during their limited tenure than do 
investors (Srinidhi et al., 2015). Cyber security is important to shareholders, the board, 
management, and all stakeholders. 
Losses in the banking industry caused by white collar crimes have reached 
billions of dollars, far in excess of conventional and traditional techniques of bank 
robbery, making cyber security an ongoing challenge and a foremost economic and 
national security concern (Bambara, 2015). Colesniuc (2013) and Vincent (2015) 
indicated that corporate governance plays a role in enhancing data security and protection 
of private, confidential, secret, and proprietary information assets (Rai & Mar, 2014).  
Data breach incidents are on the rise, resulting in severe financial consequences and legal 
implications for the affected organizations (Brewer, 2015). A 2014 report revealed that an 
estimated that 12.6 million Americans were victims of identity fraud (Sen & Borle, 
2015). In a study by Ponemon Institute on the cost of data breaches released in May 
2014, the approximate average cost per data breach incident was $5.9 million for 
organizations in the United States (Sen & Borle, 2015). 
Board leadership and composition is a popular focus of many studies addressing 
the matter of IT risks (Bambara, 2015; Brewer, 2015; Kumar & Singh, 2013). A 
challenge for board members is their ability to understand the emerging technological 
advances; the average age of directors has increased from 60.1 in 2002 to 62.6 in 2012 
(Kumar & Singh, 2013). There have been many questions raised about board composition 
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(Kumar & Singh, 2013). The board of directors and efficient corporate governance are 
critical to innovation, creating value, and maintaining the competitive advantage of the 
organization (McCahery & Vermeulen, 2014). 
Corporate crises. Delayed recall of defective products and parts remain a critical 
strategic and governance issue. Decisions made concerning a recall are important to a 
firm from three standpoints: cost, customer safety, and corporate reputation (Steinbeck, 
2014). The repercussions for many corporations may extend beyond consumer 
confidence to severe financial impact and tort violations (Jizi et al., 2014). The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) fined Toyota $1.2 billion in 2014 for sudden acceleration 
problems that Toyota executives knew about long before the recall compelled the 
company to take action (DOJ, 2014). 
The board of directors is responsible for the development of sustainable business 
strategies and the supervision of the responsible use of the assets of the firm (Jizi et al., 
2014). Banks are being held accountable. The DOJ uses the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and civil penalty provisions 
to pursue prosecutions against banks (MacDonald, 2016). FIRREA provides the DOJ 
with powers to seek civil financial penalties for violations of certain criminal statutes 
against anyone violating any of the enumerated criminal statutes that involve or affect 
financial institutions or government agencies (MacDonald, 2016). On February 9, 2012, 
the DOJ announced a $25 billion settlement with five banks, the Bank of America, JP 
Morgan Chase & Co, Wells Fargo & Company, Citigroup Inc., and Ally Financial Inc. 
(formerly GMAC)(MacDonald, 2016). 
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Through their voting rights, shareholders have the formal power to influence the 
governance of public companies (Norli, Ostergaard, & Schindele, 2015). Norli et al. 
(2015) insisted that directors should be prosecuted more often and more aggressively than 
has been done in the past, particularly when company directors or executives have 
committed a grave offense. By contrast, Travers (2013) asserted that the prosecution of 
directors was sufficient as it appears to be considerably more widespread than the 
prosecution of individual employees. Shareholders seeking to replace existing board 
members in a proxy contest must run a public campaign, hire legal expertise, and pay for 
producing and distributing their slate of directors to other shareholders of the company 
(Norli et al., 2015). 
Shareholder activism has increased since the crisis of 2007-2009, with calls for 
board member accountability (Gillian & Panasian, 2015). There has been litigation 
initiated by shareholders (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). Since 2000, there has been a 
dramatic upsurge in shareholder lawsuits against firms, executives, and board members, 
with aggregate U.S. securities class action settlements increasing from $1 billion between 
1996 and 1999 to $10.6 billion in 2006 (Gillian & Panasian, 2015). Brochet and 
Srinivasan (2014) suggested that directors who might have stopped the fraud or played a 
larger role in a securities violation, such as audit committee members, are more likely to 
be targeted; those targeted are more likely to have votes withheld and lose their board 
seat. The repercussions are broad and may be severe. Deng, Willis, and Xu (2014) found 
that defendant firms in class action lawsuits incur higher borrowing fees and interest rates 
due to, a loss of reputation of the firm. Firms subject to securities litigation have limited 
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investment opportunities, both in terms of capital expenditures and research and 
development (Autore, Hutton, Peterson, & Smith, 2014). 
Trade partnerships. Artuso and McLarney (2015) wrote that advocates of 
linking labor standards and trade policy fear that increased trade and deeper integration of 
globalization may continue to lead firms to move production to low-cost locations with 
lower standards of safety and security. Advocating for high labor standards may reduce 
wages in countries that maintain and enforce high labor standards; these same actions 
may and motivate corporations and governments to weaken or remove standards to 
improve the competitive advantage offered by their country (Artuso & McLarney, 2015).  
Corporate governance in the United States requires that banks and corporations have 
effective policies and safeguards that manage important strategic issues as board 
members have fiduciary responsibility which requires them to act and protect shareholder 
interests (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). 
Widely adopted lean practices and low production costs promote cost savings and 
competitive advantage through outsourcing, but companies that choose to outsource must 
be prepared to assume risk, both upstream and downstream throughout the supply chain 
(Chakravarty, 2013). The new outsourcing model established at Boeing involved 
establishing partnerships with approximately 50 Tier 1 strategic associates, which was a 
positive opportunity, but was quickly followed by unexpected problems (Thorne & 
Quinn, 2016). In early 2013, Boeing encountered problems with fabrication of its 787 
Dreamliner that eventually resulted in the entire fleet being grounded due to inability to 
effectively manage secondary suppliers (Thorne & Quinn, 2016). Good oversight of 
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overseas suppliers’ factory operations and strategic partners could promote the corporate 
image (Hilson, 2014). 
Success in overseeing collaborators’ global supply chains depends on shared 
value and good corporate governance that is often at odds with the realities of power, 
information asymmetry, and reward systems (Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). Poorly 
matched partners can mean reliance on an overseas company whose leaders accept 
continued poor working conditions (Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). Violations of 
workers’ legal rights in the interest of economic efficiency is fundamentally incompatible 
with the duty of multinationals to respect employees and ensure that offshore factories, 
whether internal to the organization or owned by their suppliers and subcontractors, are in 
full compliance with local laws (Preiss, 2014). Good governance transcends national 
borders. 
Connected world. There are other current and evolving corporate governance 
challenges. The global population is connected. Economic ripples that began in far-off 
nations have reverberated to other parts of the world, including the United States 
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Likewise, the economic crisis that began in the United 
States led to a global recession (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Global trade alliances, 
business computer applications, mobile computing, international migration, and global 
supply chains have increased the pace of globalization (Artuso & McLarney, 2015). 
Current trends in globalization have spurred the need to re-examine the political and 
economic wisdom of alliances such as the European Union relative to regional trade 
alliances such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (2016). 
51 
 
Resurgence of the fair-trade movement has both influenced and counteracted 
trade imbalances, outsourcing of jobs, inequality, social advocacy on the topic of 
consumers’ rights, as well as improvements in banking and corporate governance (Artuso 
& McLarney, 2015). There is value in studying mistakes made in the past, articulating 
lessons learned, and implementing mitigating strategies. Board members have a fiduciary 
responsibility to act and protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Internal and external monitoring mechanisms, the 
effectiveness of board independence, and CEO non duality governance mechanisms are 
widely believed to resolve the agency problem and result in profitability (Misangyi & 
Acharya, 2014). Consequently, board selection criteria are important to assuage the 
agency problem, allowing for strategies to mature and strong corporate governance to 
take root. 
Board Selection Criteria 
Corporate governance in the banking industry had failed many times in several 
nations, and banking crises seem to be a recurrent phenomenon: 13 major financial crises 
have been observed since the 1990s (Dermine, 2013). Flaws in corporate governance 
systems lead to financial market scandals that in turn caused significant losses to 
investors (Khemakhem & Naciri, 2015). Contingency approaches in comparative 
corporate governance can help firms maintain their financial performance (Desender, 
Aguilera, Crespi-Cladera, & Garcia-Cestona, 2013). There is a high premium placed on 
finding competent leaders who understand new business opportunities and their risks, 
have a healthy level of skepticism, and can make decisions quickly (Capriglione & 
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Casalino, 2014). Active boards of directors and board practices designed to achieve long-
term utility rather than short-term opportunistic advantages are central to the prescription 
of agency theory to protecting owners' interests, minimize agency costs, and ensure 
alignment between principals’ and agents’ interests (Conheady et al., 2015). 
Lam, Zhang, and Lee (2013) analyzed whether the norms of decision makers and 
behavioral factors such as managerial traits and biases can affect executives’ financing 
decisions. Based on these analyses, Lam et al. concluded that the executive’s type of 
leadership has an influence on fiscal policy, finance posture, and governance in any 
institution. There is increasing economic interdependence of countries around the world. 
The movement of capital across borders has been liberalized. Financial 
information is transmitted almost instantly (Valentina & Ivan, 2013). Global markets and 
financial centers are connected without interruption, 24 hours a day (Valentina & Ivan, 
2013). As a result of these trends in interconnectedness, the global financial system has 
become volatile (Valentina & Ivan, 2013). These trends increase the need for a vigilant 
board and a focus on iterative risk analysis and mitigation (Capriglione & Casalino, 
2014). There is the need for strategic agility, which is the ability of executives and boards 
of directors of companies to adapt to changes in the business environment and to 
influence that environment (Mavengere, 2013). 
The agency view of corporate governance demands sufficient monitoring to align 
agency interests with those of the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This alignment 
represents a reactive answer and in some cases, an innovative incentive contract that is 
contingent upon performance (Hoeppner & Kirchner, 2016). Such a contract 
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comprehensively governs the relationship between agency and principal interests, 
reducing the moral hazard problem (Hoeppner & Kirchner, 2016). This type of contract 
requires an effective board (Hoeppner & Kirchner, 2016). Corporate governance in banks 
involves the practices of boards of directors and senior management who must 
collaborate to set corporate objectives and provide strategic direction for responsible 
decision making, accountability to shareholders, compliance with applicable laws, 
protection of depositors, and consideration for stakeholders (Leventis et al., 2013).  
Effective corporate governance is imperative for executives and boards in the banking 
industry to thwart and manage potential crisis and deter unethical business practices 
(Leventis et al., 2013). 
There is considerable variability in the director nomination process. Some 
organizations follow formal, structured approaches, while others are relatively informal 
and organic (Clune, Hermanson, Tompkins, & Ye, 2014). In most banks in the United 
States, the nominating committee of the board usually identifies and nominates 
individuals for board service (Clune et al., 2014). External search firms and a matrix/grid 
approach for assessing director skill sets across the board are parts of the selection 
process (Clune et al., 2014). Nohel et al. (2014) found that companies that hold board 
elections every 3 years went from about 60% of S&P 500 companies in 2001 to well 
under 20% in 2014. The market perceived this change in election frequency as a positive 
one, indicating that investors preferred well-governed corporations with boards that are 
accountable to shareholders (Nohel et al., 2014). The goal of the nominating committee is 
to enhance the ability of the board to function effectively (Clune et al., 2014). 
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Business Roundtable (2012) is an organization of CEOs of U.S. companies.  
Nearly 20% of the total value of the U.S. stock market is represented in the Business 
Roundtable. Members of the association function broadly on boards of directors. 
According to members of the association, boards of directors serve with an expectation 
by shareholders and other constituencies of vigorous and diligent oversight of corporate 
affairs in: 
 selecting and evaluating the position of CEO; 
 planning for senior management development and succession; 
 reviewing, understanding and monitoring the implementation of the 
corporation's strategic plans; 
 reviewing and understanding the corporation's risk assessment and overseeing 
the corporation's risk management processes; 
 reviewing, understanding and overseeing annual operating plans and budgets; 
 focusing on the integrity and clarity of the corporation's financial statements 
and reporting; 
 advising management on significant issues facing the corporation; 
 reviewing and approving significant corporate actions; 
 reviewing management's plans for business resiliency; 
 nominating directors and committee members and overseeing effective 
corporate governance; and 
 overseeing legal and ethical compliance. 
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The skills and background of the executive and board members are intended to 
promote governance while also guiding investments in research, development, and 
innovation (Yuan, Guo, & Fang, 2014). These actions translate into superior corporate 
financial performance (Yuan et al., 2014). The composition of a board is crucial to 
effectiveness of the board and its ability to supervise the CEO (Sur et al., 2013).  
Academic institutions remain a source of knowledge (Starbuck, 2014). As purportedly 
commercially and politically neutral institutions that emphasize open, fact-based 
discussion, members of universities can enhance the quality of governance by senior 
executives as well as outside stakeholders (Starbuck, 2014). In essence, governance best 
practices and effective governance are value-enhancing strategies (Conheady et al., 
2015). 
Board member selection criteria continue to include knowledge and experience 
(Elms et al., 2015). Elms et al. (2015) reported candidates should have an existing 
knowledge of how boards operate and possess role-fit skills that complemented those of 
current directors. Viable candidates for boards of directors should also be a good group 
fit and be socially compatible with the existing directors (Bezemer, Nicholson, & 
Pugliese, 2014). Being a good group fit is essential because board members need to 
interact and work together as a team (Bezemer et al., 2014). 
Other factors that are important to board governance include term limits and 
education that encourages board members’ appreciation of the value of diversity in the 
debate (Carver, 2013). Kakabadse et al. (2015) questioned whether functional diversity 
(e.g., education, technical abilities, and functional background) and non regulated aspects 
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of diversity (e.g., socioeconomic background, personality characteristics, or values) affect 
board effectiveness. A. N. Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) investigated how 
demographic features of the board, such as age, gender, and educational composition, 
affect corporate governance in banking. A. N. Berger et al. found that having younger 
members on the board increased portfolio risk and, to a lesser extent, having a higher 
proportion of female executives also increased portfolio risk, while having board 
members with doctoral degrees reduced portfolio risk. 
Zhu, Wei, and Hillman (2014) highlighted the importance of demographic 
characteristics of appointed directors (e.g., age, education, background, and gender), but 
failed to explain whether these attributes were the reason for selection of that individual 
or whether other social and political influences played a contributing role. Other board 
member attributes include status and prestige, which help to reduce uncertainty and 
signal legitimacy to investors (Acharya & Pollock, 2012). An opposing view is that the 
more politically affiliated trustees on the board, the greater the affinity for risk-taking 
behavior and risk shifting, which is the tendency to make more daring decisions when in 
groups than when acting alone (Bradley, Pantzalis, & Yuan, 2016). 
Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2015) asserted that gender quota legislation, 
which forces firms to respond quickly to identify, develop, promote, and retain suitable 
female talent for corporate board leadership structure, has a strong and positive impact on 
the strategic direction of publicly traded and state-owned enterprises. Gender difference 
is usually a decisive factor for board performance and overall or aggregate financial 
performance in the capital markets (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014). In many industries, 
57 
 
gender diversity is positively correlated with performance (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014).  
Female directors enhance the instrumental, relational, and moral legitimacy of the board, 
thus increasing perceptions of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the board, all of 
which are pivotal to fostering shareholder trust (Perrault, 2015). Some scholars argued 
that gender-diverse boards are tougher monitors of CEOs; and although gender-diverse 
boards are usually considered a positive characteristic, they may harm well-governed 
firms where additional monitoring is counterproductive (Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, & 
Nieto, 2012). 
A. N. Berger et al. (2014) documented a negative relationship between an 
increase in the number of female board directors and bank risk resulting from less 
experience in dealing with high risks compared to male board members. Another 
perspective is that the presence of a small number of women on the board has an 
insignificant effect on board performance, and if women are a minority in the boardroom, 
they are less likely to challenge their male counterparts (Kakabadse et al., 2015). Sun, 
Zhu, and Ye (2015) espoused a more prevalent view, arguing that equalizing the board 
variable of gender diversity could influence strategic decision making and have a positive 
impact on corporate financial performance. Kakabadse et al. (2015) concluded that 
gender diversity enhances boardroom discussions, creativity, and allows for different 
perspectives; thereby, reducing the likelihood of uncritical groupthink. 
In general, board diversity fosters openness, resolution of conflicts, integration of 
different perspectives, and allows for an environment in which better decisions are made 
(Sun et al., 2015). The board of directors not only advises and monitors the CEO’s 
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activities, but also makes strategic decisions (Mathew, Ibrahim, & Archbold, 2016). 
Mathew et al. (2016) asserted that the ability of board members to provide valuable input 
and challenge decisions depends on the board composition and its attributes. Diversity is 
important toward board performance (Zhu et al., 2014). Walker, Machold, and Ahmed 
(2015), investigated whether personality trait diversity in conjunction with demographic 
diversity explained the differences in cognitive conflict and affective conflict in boards, 
found no direct relationship. Walker et al. concluded it is important for the director 
nomination process to encourage the selection of directors with varied demographic 
attributes to enhance board dynamics. 
The banking industry, which was held accountable for the credit crunch that 
began in the United States in 2008 and spread globally, is important to the U.S. economy: 
it captured more than half (58%) of the global investment banking revenues in 2012 
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Gilles (2016) cautioned that the global economic crisis 
that began as a banking system crisis pointed to a pattern of instability and possible future 
financial crises due to sovereign debt, growing inequality, and globalization. 
Ramachandran, Ngete, Subramaninan, and Sambasivan (2015) stated that globalization 
and multinationalization of businesses had increased the need for best practices in 
corporate governance. Gilles warned that the United States is on the precipice of another 
financial crisis unless bank governance is strengthened. The next looming financial crisis 
involves the student loan/debt bubble (Mueller, 2015). Student loans are the second 
highest category of consumer debt in the United States and account for $1.2 trillion of 
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debt, the result of the average 4-year private university tuition having increased from 
$10,273 in 1974 to $31,231 in 2014 (Mueller, 2015). 
During the economic crisis that began in 2008, the U.S. government bailed out 
some banks that were deemed too big to fail (Barth & Wihlborg, 2016). The notion of 
being too big to fail is a reference to banks that are perceived as generating unacceptable 
risk to the banking system and indirectly to the economy as a whole; if these banks were 
to default, they would be unable to fulfill their obligations and would trigger a collapse in 
the economy (Barth & Wihlborg, 2016). Investors believe assurances made by the federal 
government to not bail out large firms in the future is a hollow promise because of past 
precedents and the potential damage to the economy (Gromley, Johnson, & Changyong, 
2015). As of 2016, some banks may still be too big to fail. Roe (2014) asserted that many 
investors believe there is the high likelihood that big banks will be bailed out again if 
another crisis comes to fruition. 
Size, the number of subsidiaries, and extent of involvement in market-based 
activities increased systemic risk (Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2014). Controls instituted 
through corporate governance help to keep firms competitive and efficient, but these 
controls deteriorate in too-big-to-fail financial firms (Roe, 2014). Roe (2014) argued that 
these controls impede shareholders, the board of directors, and the CEO from 
restructuring the firm, even if such a restructuring would be operationally wise. Board 
composition and board selection criteria are critical to ensuring effective corporate 
governance (Kumar & Singh, 2013). 
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The answer to the question of what constitutes effective corporate governance 
continues to evolve. Cook and Glass (2015) concluded that diverse boards rather than 
mere tokenism are positively associated with effective corporate governance practices 
and product development; diverse boards are paramount for achieving corporate benefits.  
Effective corporate governance is based on internal and external environments and 
ensures the optimal use of resources, maximization of corporate performance, and 
minimization of risk, all while protecting the interests of investors and stakeholders 
(Fülöp, 2013). Corporate governance is the purview of the CEO and board members 
(Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Effective corporate governance is incumbent upon control 
of the board over financial reporting (Fülöp, 2013). Credit risk, the risk of loss due to 
debtors’ nonpayment of the principal or interest on a loan or a particular line of credit, 
has resulted from poor governance practices (Switzer & Wang, 2013). 
Some propositions for board modifications have recommended professional 
boards consisting of retired executives with industry-specific expertise (Hemphill & 
Laurence, 2014). While Hemphill and Laurence (2014) advocated for a professional 
board, Carver (2013) argued that retired executives are vulnerable to groupthink because 
they share similar perspectives and lack creativity. Zeitoun et al. (2014) along with 
Carver, contended that a professional board is a poor substitute for an advisory system 
entirely under CEO control. Lack of full vision, clarity, and creativity are traits of 
groupthink (Carver, 2013). There is no full vision without a wide variety of perspectives, 
there is no clarity without a willingness to dig into issues, and there is no creativity 
without diverse perspectives (Carver, 2013). 
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The number of hours that independent directors spend on board-related activities 
(and commensurate compensation received) should be considered as potential value-
adding corporate governance improvements (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014). Allocating 
more power to the board of directors is the best strategy for corporations because the 
meetings are easier to convene, cost less to the corporation when board members are 
more specialized, and specialized board members are knowledgeable about the situation 
and business of the company (Cools, 2014). Ylinen (2013) concluded that stable, 
prosperous banks and good development outcomes contribute to national prosperity, 
improved welfare, and better standards of living for employees, local businesses, and 
shareholders. 
Board members have a fiduciary duty—a legal obligation of loyalty—to represent 
shareholders and maximize shareholder return (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Fiduciary 
duty is meant to ensure there is a reduced risk of valuable information being disclosed to 
others and that directors are strong advocates of stakeholder interests (Kim & Ozdemir, 
2014). Board monitoring of the CEO is more easily achieved when the board has the 
expertise to process the information and render informed decisions (Tian, 2014). To this 
end, board members must be capable, knowledgeable, and willing to perform their duties 
(Tian, 2014). Board variables such as experience, education, part-time and full-time 
member status, attendance at meetings, age, the dual role of CEO and board chair, 
independence, and diversity are all important (Baulkaran, 2014; Hemphill & Laurence, 
2014; Krause et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Nohel et al., 2014). 
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This review of professional and academic literature addressed the topics of 
agency theory, other governance theories, history of the corporate governance problem, 
governance initiatives and strategies, current corporate governance challenges, and board 
selection criteria. Corporate and bank governance continues to be a topic of great interest 
to scholars and economists. Board composition is among the most important factors in 
ensuring effective governance; as such, director selection criteria merit the focus of study. 
The appropriate research question for this study is, what board selection criteria do 
banking leaders use to ensure effective governance? 
Agency theory was the appropriate framework to explore effective governance 
using a qualitative case study method and design with open-ended interview questions.  
External governance is important but relies on a strong internal governance system. 
Determining the board selection criteria that ensure effective governance could lead to 
better business strategies and increased financial prosperity for all stakeholders. Given 
the possibility of the occurrence of future financial crises, director selection criteria are an 
important area of research for professionals and academics. 
Transition  
Section 1 included a discussion of the business problem that CEOs and boards 
lack director qualification criteria to create effective strategies for strong corporate 
governance. I also discussed the foundation of the study, the background of the corporate 
governance problem, and the nature of the study. The research question aligns with the 
specific business problem and the interview questions. 
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The conceptual framework applies to the principles of corporate governance and 
strategic management. In Section 2, I will address the role of the researcher, participant 
selection strategy, research method and design, population and sampling method, 
research ethics, data collection instruments, data analysis, reliability, and validity.  The 
findings of the study will be presented in Section 3. The application of the research to 
professional practice, implications for social change, and recommendations for further 




Section 2: The Project 
Section 2 will contain a discussion of the research method and design I selected 
for this study. I will also provide a description of my role as the researcher relative to 
studying the literature, obtaining the perception of participants, and analyzing the 
responses. In addition, also included in this section will be discussions of the population, 
the role of ethics, the data collection instrument and technique, data analysis, and 
reliability and validity. In this study, I obtained and analyzed the perceptions of business 
leaders in a California bank. This study was designed to provide insights into optimal 
board selection criteria and effective corporate governance strategies. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore strategies to 
improve board selection criteria that banking leaders use to promote effective 
governance. The targeted population comprised of banking leaders in one California bank 
who demonstrated governance procedures for selecting board members and effective 
governance that ensured that the bank did not experience failures or government bailouts 
during the last financial crisis (2007–2009). The findings of this doctoral study have 
implications for positive social change, including economic and social benefits through 
profitable corporations to stakeholders, communities, and the economy as a whole. The 
social benefits may include enhancing self-worth when individuals remain employed in 
solvent corporations and promoting stable thriving families and communities. 
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Role of the Researcher 
Prior to data collection, my role as the researcher in this qualitative study was to 
plan the research, select the appropriate design, conduct the literature review, and 
understand and identify the gaps in the literature. Academic integrity requires an 
acknowledgment of existing literature (Luce, McGill, & Peracchio, 2012). My role 
during the data collection was to conduct semistructured interviews with participants in 
face-to-face settings, via Internet chat sessions, or by telephone. 
In my current professional and personal roles, I had no relationship to the topic or 
firms on which this study was focused. I conducted this study in full compliance with 
ethical principles, such as those provided in the Belmont Report (see Mikesell, Bromley, 
& Khodyakov, 2013), to protect the rights and well-being of the research participants. I 
completed the National Institute of Health web-based training course on “Protecting 
Human Research Participants” on November 09, 2014 with Certificate Number 1614488.  
In this study, I respected participants according to the precepts of the Belmont Report. As 
part of protecting the rights of potential participants and actual participants, I provided 
them with sufficient information about the study and allowed them to make an 
independent decision about whether to participate (see Mikesell et al., 2013). Strategies I 
used to mitigate bias during data collection included asking questions that were not meant 
to elicit a particular answer, not asking questions that prevented the participant from 
freely articulating his or her own perceptions, and not driving participants to 
predetermined conclusions (see Boatright, 2013). 
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The purpose of research is to determine the truth (Boatright, 2013), and it is 
important to be ethical in all phases and practices to have a credible study. In terms of 
situational biases, I would be remiss if I did not clarify the impact of the largest economic 
recession since the Great Depression on me. Likewise, I acknowledge my worldview is 
that some individuals with fiduciary responsibility did not perform their duties to the 
fullest extent. Recognizing this bias from the outset enabled me to prepare to undertake 
research while removing my bias. My clarification of these biases lends authenticity to 
my study. 
It is important for the researcher to be cognizant of reflexivity, which is the active 
acknowledgement by the researcher that his or her own actions and decisions will 
inevitably have an impact on the meaning and context of the experience under 
investigation (Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015). When undertaking the research work, I 
bracketed my feelings about the issues; utilized my ability to develop and maintain a 
stance of curiosity toward the data; and engaged in reflexivity to self-monitor the impact 
of my biases, beliefs, and personal experiences relative to the research (see Berger, 
2013). I provided an informed consent form to all participants before initiating data 
collection through interviews. 
A qualitative research interview involves gathering information and facts, 
eliciting stories, and learning about experiences (Rossetto, 2014). The semistructured 
interview protocol is commonly used in case study research (Yin, 2014). A researcher 
uses an interview protocol to set expectations, uses an interview log, and determines an 
appropriate location (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). This form of interviewing resembles the 
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guided interview rather than a process of structured queries; in conducting semistructured 
interviews, the interviewer poses a stream of questions in a fluid or unstructured manner 
(Yin, 2014). I followed some suggestions from literature (Rossetto, 2014; Jacob & 
Furgerson, 2012; Yin, 2014) by gathering information, utilizing an interview protocol and 
asking the participant’s interview questions and some follow-up questions. The 
semistructured interview was ideal for exploring participants’ overall perceptions 
regarding utilizing corporate governance in strategy formulation and execution as it 
enables follow-up questions. 
Participants 
Board characteristics play an important role in organizations by improving the 
corporate governance of the organization (Hassan, Marimuthu, & Kaur Johl, 2015). In 
this study, the participants represented various positions on board membership, selection 
committees, and executive leadership. The eligibility criteria for the study participants 
were knowledge about the selection criteria necessary for board membership and 
successful governance of the bank. Other eligibility criteria for the study participants 
included board members, selection committee members of the bank, and bank leadership 
who had been associated with the bank for at least 3 years at the time of the study. Board 
characteristics are key determinants of several corporate decisions (Iqbal et al., 2015). 
Consequently, for good governance, banks and companies need a mix of female and male 
directors who possess the appropriate competencies (i.e., knowledge, skills, and 
experience) to contribute to board decision making (Elms et al., 2015). 
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I began this study by obtaining permission from the Walden University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct this research. Upon obtaining permission 
from the IRB, I contacted executives of the target bank by mail and by visiting the bank 
to obtain assistance in contacting members of the board of directors. I initiated contact 
with the potential participants through surface mail, e-mail, and with telephone calls until 
I received a response. My strategy for gaining access to participants was through an 
initial contact to invite business leaders to participate in the study. The next recruitment 
step was sending consent letters by regular mail to each participant and establishing 
interview dates and times. Ultimately, I interviewed them over the phone. 
Technology has transformed the interviewing process, enabling researchers to 
reduce costs and increase the reach of data collection via telephones (Lord, Bolton, 
Fleming, & Anderson, 2016). In developing a working relationship with the leaders who 
accepted my invitation to participate in the study, I explained the nature and objectives of 
the research, obtained informed consent, coordinated schedule availability for the 
interview, and provided updates on the progress of my research. Interviews are often used 
in qualitative research, and semistructured interviews are appropriate as they enable 
follow-up questions and often produce comprehensive responses (Dresch et al., 2015). 
I used open ended questions to interview the participants. The use of open-ended 
questions would be best for obtaining comprehensive responses from participants (Starr, 
2014). To establishing a working relationship, I engaged in rapport with the participants, 
conducted the interviews, provided my contact information, and Walden University’s 
contact information with approval information for the study. Interviewing is a data 
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collection method often used in combination with other methods to develop a better 
account of the empirical phenomenon (McNulty, Zattoni, & Douglas, 2013). 
Research Method and Design  
The researcher typically chooses from three categories of research methods 
commonly used in a doctoral study: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods (Yin, 
2014). The qualitative researcher is focused on applied and theoretical findings or 
discoveries, based on research questions through field study in natural conditions (Park & 
Park, 2016). Quantitative researchers rely on the testing of hypotheses to achieve the 
research goals in controlled and contrived studies (Park & Park, 2016). Mixed methods 
research combines quantitative and qualitative methods in the same study (Venkatesh, 
Brown, & Bala, 2013). The research question, constraints, and type of participants are 
important determinants of the appropriate methodological and design choice (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016). 
Research Method 
A research method is a guide for researchers to follow in the search for necessary 
answers to the research problem (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). To study this 
business problem of agency conflict and corporate governance, I used the qualitative 
research method, which is a holistic research approach that allows the researcher to 
synthesize data from multiple perspectives and extend that synthesis to create knowledge 
and leverage that knowledge in creative ways (see Singh, 2015). Through my study, I 
explored board selection criteria and strategies that ensure effective governance. The 
defining characteristics of qualitative research are (a) data collection in the natural field 
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setting, (b) the researcher as key to data collection, (c) multiple sources of data, (d) focus 
on the meanings of participants’ responses, and (e) interpretive inquiry and holistic 
account (McNulty, Zattoni et al., 2013). The qualitative research method is best for 
exploring the perceptions of participants (Starr, 2014). 
Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, and Mitchell (2014) wrote that the quantitative 
method allows for the study of a sample and the generalization of findings from that 
sample to the population through statistical analysis. This method could be used to collect 
and analyze data that represent trends, historical numbers, and allow for the comparison 
of variables (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). Bhattacherjee (2012) pointed out that the 
quantitative method is the most appropriate research technique to determine if a 
relationship exists between variables. The quantitative method is a rigorous research 
approach, appropriate for testing hypotheses about the relationship between a studies' 
independent and dependent variables (Bettis et al., 2014). The quantitative method was 
not appropriate for this study as I did not test a hypothesis or compare variables. 
A mixed methods approach was not appropriate for this study as this approach is a 
preferred method when neither the qualitative nor the quantitative method alone could 
sufficiently answer the research question (Venkatesh et al., 2013). A chief aim of my 
study was to explore board selection criteria that promote effective governance. The 
research question and purpose statement are important factors in the choice of the 
research methodology from among quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods. The 
qualitative method was best for gathering experiences and obtaining comprehensive 




In this study, I used a case study design to determine and propose board selection 
criteria that contribute toward effective governance. A case study design should be 
considered (a) to answer how and why questions, (b) to cover contextual conditions, (c) 
when a researcher cannot manipulate participants’ behavior, or (d) when the boundaries 
are not clear between phenomenon and context (Yin, 2014). The main objectives of the 
case design are to explore, describe, and explain (Dresch et al., 2015).  
In this study, I chose to undertake a single case study, which was critical to my 
conceptual theory and used to determine whether the propositions are correct or whether 
an alternative set of explanations might be more relevant (see Yin, 2014). The rationale 
for undertaking a single case study includes an extreme or an unusual case and the 
revelatory case (Yin, 2014). A single case can contribute to knowledge and theory 
building by confirming, challenging, or extending the theory (Yin, 2014). A single case is 
ideal in management research when revelatory or exemplary data are sought or when the 
study offers opportunities for unusual research access (Mariotto, Pinto Zanni, & De 
Moraes, 2014). A single case study is also ideal in a revelatory case that can contribute to 
knowledge (Yin, 2014). A single case could also help to determine whether an alternative 
set of explanations might be more relevant (Yin, 2014). 
I had several other qualitative design options. The phenomenological approach is 
used to study the way a person lives, creates, and relates in the world (Conklin, 2013). 
Phenomenology can be employed to understand shared human experience because the 
design focuses on the participants’ experiences and meaning (Conklin, 2013). On the 
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other hand, ethnographic designs are appropriate for studying a group in which members 
share a culture (Hampshire, 2014). Neither phenomenological nor ethnographical designs 
were appropriate for studying board selection criteria that promote effective governance. 
A phenomenological design was not appropriate as the purpose of this study was not to 
explore the way people live or share their lived experiences. Ethnographical design was 
not an appropriate design as in this study, I did not focus on a group in which members 
share a culture. 
A key to conducting a case study is reaching data saturation. Data saturation is 
said to occur when no new data are obtained from additional interviews (Houghton, 
Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). The number of interviews that should be conducted is 
not as important as achieving data saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015). The objective of the 
interview process is not about the numbers per se, but about rich (quality) and thick 
(quantity) data, structuring interview questions to ensure the researcher asks multiple 
participants the same questions, and interviewing the people that one would not normally 
consider (Fusch & Ness, 2015). 
Population and Sampling  
The population was comprised of 10 leaders at a single bank in California, eight 
board members, the executive vice president, and chief information officer. The financial 
crisis of 2007–2009 engulfed the banking system of the United States before spreading 
around the world (Bordo, Redish, & Rockoff, 2015). Few banks escaped adverse 
outcomes and financial loss resulting from the 2007–2009 financial crisis (Paulet et al., 
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2015). A single case and focus on a single bank sufficed to highlight the selection criteria 
for board membership and the governance strategies that may be emulated by others. 
I interviewed four business leaders from the bank to achieve data saturation.   
The interviewees were current board members and executive vice presidents. The owners 
of banking institutions appoint board members to provide high-level oversight within the 
organization (Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). A case study interview requires the 
researcher to operate on two levels at the same time: satisfying the needs of the line of 
inquiry and simultaneously putting forth friendly and nonthreatening questions in the 
open-ended interview (Yin, 2014). 
The four business leaders with knowledge of the bank’s selection criteria were 
chosen through purposeful sampling. The participants in this study have at least 3 years’ 
association with the bank. Purposeful sampling method could be used to select 
participants likely to provide relevant information (Palinkas et al., 2013). Purposeful 
sampling is based upon meeting inclusion criteria such as required knowledge and 
information in which elements are selected from the target population on the basis of 
their fit with the purpose of the study (Robinson, 2014). For this study, I used confirming 
and disconfirming purposeful sampling to confirm the importance and meaning of 
possible patterns and check out the viability of emergent findings with new data (Palinkas 
et al., 2013) was appropriate. Conducting purposeful sampling of business leaders 
allowed me to interview individuals who have knowledge on the selection criteria for 
board members that promote effective governance. It is important to focus on 
interviewing individuals who have the authority or the knowledge to offer useful insights 
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and comments on the research topic (Rowley, 2012). The population selected aligns with 
the overarching research question. 
Ethical Research 
The study of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context obligates a 
researcher to important ethical practices akin to those followed in medical research (Yin, 
2014). Informed consent is a key element for protecting the welfare of research 
participants, as established by the Nuremberg Code; in addition, the Helsinki Declaration 
underscored the importance of having an ethics committee review a research proposal, 
which includes an informed consent form (Kumar & Singh, 2013). The informed consent 
form contains Walden University’s approval number 03-23-17-0465001 for this doctoral 
study. Consent to participate in research was an important component of conducting an 
ethical research study that involves human participants (Braunack-Mayer et al., 2015). 
The informed consent process included providing information in written form and 
explaining the form. Participants were required to sign an informed consent form prior to 
interviewing them (see Appendix B). The informed consent form contains Walden 
University’s approval number for this doctoral study. 
The form includes the purpose of the research and the proposed process, as well 
as the methods the researcher will use to maintain privacy. Participants in a study must be 
assured of privacy and confidentiality (Dekking, van der Graaf, & van Delden, 2014). I 
assured participants that the information being sought was for research purpose only and 
ensured their anonymity by labeling participants as P1 through P4. A researcher is 
responsible for conducting a case study with special care and sensitivity (Yin, 2014). The 
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interviews did not include the individual participants’ or the bank name and will be used 
only for the doctoral research study. The informed consent form also explained the 
expectations of participation, the withdrawal process, ethical principles that I followed, 
and an affirmation of the individual’s rights to understand a study before agreeing to 
participate (Knepp, 2014). An informed consent form must emphasize the voluntary 
nature of participation (Dekking et al., 2014). I provided each participant a copy of the 
informed consent form. The informed consent agreement used for this study and 
interview records are in a locked filing cabinet to which only I would have access for 5 
years. 
As part of the informed consent process, I explained to potential participants that 
they may withdraw from the study at any time of their choosing. The National Institute of 
Health issues a certificate upon completion of a course for conducting studies involving 
the collection of sensitive information. I completed this course of study. This course of 
study explains that no incentives should be offered to participants. I did not offer any 
incentives for participating in this study. I took all necessary measures to ensure adequate 
ethical protection of participants. 
A researcher must be ethical in all practices (Boatright, 2013). I sought 
clarification and explored data objectively, remembering that a primary purpose of 
undertaking research is to find the truth. Interviews should be free of prejudices and 
presuppositions (Tosey, Lawley, & Meese, 2014). Ethical practices include taking care 
when identifying themes to ensure that each theme is actually represented in the 
transcripts being analyzed and not a product of the researcher’s misinterpretation 
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(Rodham et al., 2015). I followed ethical practices throughout the process of conducting 
the research, ensuring the undertaking is completed without allowing my worldview to 
influence or temper my assumptions. 
I maintained all data on a password-protected external drive to which only I have 
access. These data will be maintained for 5 years to protect confidential information, 
including the identity of participants. After 5 years, I will shred the documents and 
destroy the external drive containing research data. The final doctoral manuscript 
includes the Walden IRB approval number. I ensured that the document does not include 
names or any other identifiable information of individuals or organizations. 
Data Collection Instruments  
I was the primary collection instrument in this study. A researcher undertaking a 
qualitative case study is the primary data collection instrument (Turner & Norwood, 
2013). Case study evidence includes archival records and interviews (Yin, 2014). Silic 
and Back (2013) utilized open-ended questions within semistructured interviews to 
explore perceptions on governance. According to Yin (2014), semistructured interviews 
and company document analysis are common sources of evidence in case studies. 
Semistructured interviews are an appropriate way for the researcher to focus on the 
details that address the research question (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I employed a single 
case study design and conducted semistructured interviews to explore board selection 
criteria that promote corporate governance from the perspective of business leaders in a 
single bank in California. 
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Participants offered answers to a series of preliminary questions. The interviews 
began with my introducing myself and stating the purpose of the research; I asked 
permission to record the interview and assure the participant of confidentiality. The 
participants declined to permit the recording of the interviews.  Documentation is a key 
aspect of data collection (Yin, 2014). I documented the responses from the interviews in a 
Microsoft Word document that is easy for storage and retrieval. 
I also collected secondary data for this study. Secondary data could support other 
significant findings in a study (Hensmans, 2015). Secondary data collection included an 
examination of publicly available archival documents with financial reports and business 
journals. These data, such as board membership and company annual financial 
information, was collected from the bank website, the EDGAR database (an online 
resource maintained by the SEC), and data from the Hoover’s database maintained by 
Dun & Bradstreet. Secondary data could proffer adequate data required for undertaking 
rigorous research, even though it may exist for other purposes. Kaufman and Hwang 
(2015) triangulated their study’s data with secondary data to collaborate the open-ended 
interview responses in their case study on two French banks operating in the United 
States. Brown (2015) collected secondary data in his qualitative case study of financial 
crimes to support interview responses. 
Member checking is a technique to validate the researcher’s interpretation of the 
interview data collected; the process enhances the academic rigor of the study and allows 
for additional data to be collected in the form of corrections or modifications to the data 
previously collected during the interview (Harvey, 2015). Member checking is when a 
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researcher shares the interpretation of the participant’s responses with the participants to 
confirm that it represents their answer and validates the findings (Tong, Chapman, Israni, 
Gordon, & Craig, 2013). I conducted member checking to enhance the reliability of the 
interview responses and triangulate the interview results with information available 
through publicly available company archival documents.  
Member checking helped to confirm participants intended responses and validate 
my interpretation. A researcher may triangulate by using multiple sources of data to 
enhance the reliability of their study (Trangkanont & Charoenngam, 2014). I used (a) 
semistructured interviews with open-ended questions, (b) bank archival documents, (c) 
financial reports, (d) business journals and (e) methodological triangulation to enhance 
the reliability and validity of my research. 
Data Collection Technique 
My data sources are semistructured interviews with open-ended questions, bank 
archival documents, financial reports, and business journals. Semistructured interviews 
are used by researchers to pose additional follow-up questions to delve more deeply into 
participants’ experiences and knowledge (Dresch et al., 2015). Secondary data such as 
bank archival documents, financial reports, and business journals are useful for validation 
(Venkatesh et al., 2013). 
Primary methods for data collection in case studies are semistructured and 
unstructured interviews (Yin, 2014). In conducting semistructured interviews, the 
researcher poses open-ended questions and, if necessary, asks additional probing 
questions to gain deeper insight into participants’ knowledge and experience (Dresch et 
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al., 2015). Semistructured interviewing is appropriate for gathering comprehensive 
responses (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I followed Rowley’s (2012) protocol and process, 
which included the design and planning of the interview process that I used for 
conducting the interviews. According to Rowley, the researcher’s initial contact with 
potential participants is important. The quality of the initial e-mail message, telephone 
call, or letter is key to study success.  
Jacob and Furgerson (2012) advocated that first-time qualitative researchers use 
an interview protocol to assist them in collecting data. I followed the steps Jacob and 
Furgerson recommended, arranging interviews in an ideal location or medium, being 
willing to make instant revisions to the interview protocol, and keeping the interview 
within reasonable time limits. The researcher must be clear as to the amount of time that 
the interview will take, capture the interest of the interviewee, and follow-up if the initial 
contact does not provoke a response (Rowley, 2012). 
Face-to-face interviews allow a researcher to obtain both verbal and nonverbal 
cues (Rowley, 2012). Disadvantages of interviewing include the time required to travel to 
conduct multiple interviews, the cost, and the difficulty of discussing sensitive topics 
when face-to-face (Lord et al., 2016). If a researcher has difficulty obtaining agreement 
from potential interviewees to meet for face-to-face interviews, the researcher should 
consider telephone, Skype, or even e-mail interviews (Rowley, 2012). The anonymity of 
telephone interviews may be more conducive for discussing sensitive issues than face-to-
face interactions (Lord et al., 2016). I took extensive notes during the interviews and read 
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the responses back to the participants to validate the interview and mailed the interview 
notes to each participant to complete member checking. 
Secondary data in the form of publicly available company documents was also 
collected as part of this study. Secondary data are important for corroboration and 
triangulation in a research study (Hensmans, 2015). Secondary data could be used to 
confirm and disconfirm data and information (Hensmans, 2015). Qualitative secondary 
data entail the use of existing data to develop new scientific understanding (Irwin, 2013).   
The disadvantages of using secondary data are that the data may not be an accurate 
portrayal of existing information (Irwin, 2013). I utilized reliable secondary data derived 
from public available sources: data from the website of the bank, document analysis, and 
archival records of past performance. I triangulated secondary data with participant 
interviews to corroborate participants’ responses. Robeson and O'Connor (2013) used 
secondary data to determine the effect of governance board on firms' performance 
through innovation. 
Once collected, data were coded and analyzed with qualitative data analysis 
software. I explored key themes from interview responses and related those themes to 
information from the literature review regarding corporate governance. I used 
methodological triangulation to explore whether the documentation supports the findings 
from the interviews. Finally, I determined how the themes relate to the conceptual 
framework of the study. Researchers using case study design could use methodological 
triangulation to perceive all the facets of the data, extrapolate the meaning inherent in the 
data and to compare and analyze the same empirical events (Denzin, 2012). 
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Data Organization Technique  
I did not record the interviews due to the participants taking exception to being 
recorded. I took detailed notes in Microsoft Word documents during the calls. Secondary 
data in this study included publicly available data such as company financial statements, 
governance documents from the website of the bank, data from the EDGAR database, 
and data from the Hoover’s database. Using computers for qualitative data analysis, also 
known as computer-assisted qualitative data analysis, has many advantages, including 
identifying relevant quotations on the computer screen and coding using virtual-colored 
stripes (Odena, 2013). 
I utilized qualitative data analysis software application to identify the themes, 
facilitate coding, and to analyze data. Qualitative software can help the researcher to 
develop and renegotiate insights from theory and interview data, as well as enhance 
trustworthiness, transparency, and publication potential (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012).  
Data for each analysis are kept safe but accessible to enable retrieval, along with other 
data and documents in workbooks that will be stored on a password-protected external 
drive. When not in use, the external drive will be kept in a locked filing cabinet to which 
only I would have access. The external drive will be kept for 5 years following the 
completion of this study, after which it will be destroyed. 
Data Analysis  
Data analysis included methodological triangulation. Methodological 
triangulation involves using more than one kind of data to study a phenomenon, 
comparing multiple data sources to confirm and make findings credible (Fusch & Ness, 
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2015; Houghton et al., 2013). Hoque, Covaleski, and Gooneratne (2013) defined 
triangulation as the usage of data from different sources in the study of the same 
phenomenon; triangulation is important for credibility and validation. These data were 
collected and analyzed to allow for data triangulation. I achieved data saturation by using 
different sources of information: semistructured interviews with open-ended questions, 
bank archival documents, financial reports, and business journals. I used Yin’s (2014) 
data analysis approach: (a) compiling, (b) disassembling, (c) reassembling, (d) 
interpreting the meaning and (e) drawing conclusions from the data. 
Compiling   
Compiling data is the documentation and organization of the data (Yin, 2014).  
The primary research question for this qualitative research study was: What board 
selection criteria do banking leaders use to ensure effective governance? Effective 
governance structures are essential to achieving and maintaining public trust and 
confidence in the banking system, as well as ensuring the proper functioning of the 
banking sector and the economy as a whole (Leventis et al., 2013). 
To answer the research question, I interviewed four business leaders affiliated 
with a single bank in California. I compiled data through semistructured interviews and 
open-ended questions. Another source of data for this study was secondary data using 
information available through publicly available company archival documents. 
Disassembling   
Disassembling data is grouping data elements into labels (Yin, 2014). I read the 
interview responses and looked for recurring words and phrases then formed categories 
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which were relevant to the research questions. I coded the concepts and ideas from the 
interviews and secondary data after member checking, then critically analyzed the data 
using qualitative data analysis software. Researchers use tags and labels to highlight 
different segments of relevant text (Dasgupta, 2015). The logical and sequential process 
for the data analysis upon completion of data collection is the transcription, coding with 
qualitative software application to identify the themes, and data analysis (Odena, 2013). 
There is software specifically designed to analyze qualitative text (Sinkovics & 
Alfoldi, 2012). I used available software to analyze rich textural data from the interviews, 
themes from the literature review regarding corporate governance, and the conceptual 
framework of the study, agency theory. Researchers may utilize the comment feature in 
Microsoft Word to highlight codes (Cater, Machtmes, & Fox, 2013). I used the comment 
feature in Microsoft Word to highlight codes. Systematic analysis aided by software 
supported my ability to manage and retrieve the various types of data (e.g., transcripts 
and notes) across some data sets and increase the possibilities to substantiate research 
claims in qualitative data analysis (Odena, 2013). 
Reassembling   
Reassembling is conducted by categorizing data into groups (Yin, 2014). A 
researcher conducts qualitative content analysis on the themes that emerge from the 
interview transcripts (Schreier, 2012). This method of analysis is one of the several 
qualitative methods available for analyzing data and interpreting its meaning (Schreier, 
2012). The approach represents a systematic and objective means of describing and 
quantifying phenomena, especially aspects described in interview transcripts. 
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During the categorization, the groups of themes in the data became evident.  
Reassembling includes the categorization of the themes in the interview transcripts 
(Schreier, 2012) and the secondary data. Microsoft Word has tools that aid in analyzing 
text (Seidman, 2013). Sorting of data is a proven method for the identification of 
prevailing themes (Bishop & Lexchin, 2013). I took stock of themes that emerged from 
secondary data and input them into an Excel spreadsheet. I coded the key words from the 
interview responses and input them into an Excel spreadsheet. I analyzed the document 
themes with the themes and key words from interviews. The categorization is crucial in 
the interpretation of the data in enumerating significant findings. The categorization 
helped to identify the major categories and compelling themes in the study. 
Interpretation   
The interpretation stage involves creating narratives from the data (Yin, 2014). 
This analysis confirmed the participants’ responses to interview questions such as board 
composition, separation of the role of the CEO and board chair. It included the general 
performance of the bank within the past several years, including the period of the 2007–
2009 financial crisis. 
I focused on the recurring themes from the interviews, relating the key themes 
with the existing and new literature that emerges before final project acceptance. I also 
related the themes to the conceptual framework, agency theory. I utilized methodological 
triangulation to confirm or to find inconsistencies between semistructured interview 
responses, member checking, and company archival records. 
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Concluding   
Concluding involves the original research question, the data, discussion, and 
interpretation of the findings (Yin, 2014). It includes significant findings and the lessons 
learned in the study. Concluding involves drawing conclusions from the data (Yin, 2014). 
This section of the study includes statements that describe the outcome of a research and 
new insights. 
A study’s conclusion reveals the key findings, the significance of the theory, and 
the need for future studies (Goldberg & Allen, 2015). I related the key themes with recent 
studies on corporate governance and conceptual framework. I observed the frequency of 
the themes, analyze and reported my findings. 
Reliability and Validity  
Reliability and validity are important in research. In a doctoral study, reliability 
and validity are the difference between having an acceptable study that could provide 
guidance to scholars and practitioners or a study that is challenged and rejected. The 
trustworthiness of qualitative content analysis is also often presented by using terms such 
as credibility, dependability, conformability, transferability, and authenticity (Elo et al., 
2014). 
Reliability 
Reliability of a research study is dependent upon consistent information, 
appropriate and reliable research methods and procedures, meticulous documentation, 
unambiguous research questions, and a comprehensive research plan (Kihn & Ihantola, 
2015). Dependability in qualitative research indicates the consistency of the research data 
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(Houghton et al., 2013). Dependability is similar to reliability and refers to the 
consistency of findings across time and researchers (Hays, Wood, Dahl, & Kirk-Jenkins, 
2016). 
I attained dependability through adequate documentation, maintaining an audit 
trail of my research study, and conducting member checking to ensure rigorous data 
interpretation (Houghton et al., 2013). I conducted member checking to ensure the 
dependability of the data. Member checking involves sharing the interpretation of the 
participants’ interview responses with the participants to confirm that it represents their 
answer (Tong et al., 2013). Member checking allows modifications and validation of the 
data (Harvey, 2015). 
Validity 
Validity refers to the legitimacy of the findings and the extent to which data are 
plausible, credible, and defensible when challenged (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Secondary 
data from other sources enables validation. To ensure validity, the researcher must report 
how the results were created, enabling readers to clearly follow the analysis and resulting 
conclusions (Schreier, 2012). Credibility involves the focus of the research and refers to 
confidence in how well the data address the intended focus (Houghton et al., 2013). To 
ensure credibility, I used triangulation with semistructured interviews, member checking, 
and company archival records. Credibility is the overall believability of a study (Hays et 
al., 2016). The research effort was dedicated to answering the research question. 
Transferability occurs when details of the study are captured and the outcomes 
and findings have meaning to others in similar situations (El Hussein, Jakubec, & Osuji, 
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2015). Transferability is attainable when there is sufficient information to replicate the 
study by future researchers (Houghton et al., 2013). The burden of demonstrating that a 
set of findings applies to another context rests with future researchers rather than the 
original researcher (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Confirmability relates to the accuracy 
or accurate reflections of participants’ perspectives without researchers’ views interfering 
with findings (Hays et al., 2016). Confirmability is reflected in the analysis and findings 
of a research study and I substantiated the confirmability of the study through member 
checking (Cope, 2014). 
Data saturation is attained when there is no new theme emerging from the 
interview data and documentation (Liu, 2014). A method of attaining data saturation is 
asking multiple participants the same questions (Fusch & Ness, 2015). I asked four 
participants the same questions and utilized follow-up questions. Triangulation is the 
convergence of data from different sources to determine the consistency and credibility of 
a finding (Yin, 2014). According to Fusch and Ness (2015), triangulation strategies 
enable a researcher to check for the existence of new relationships. Collecting and 
analyzing data from different sources enables triangulation (Trangkanont & 
Charoenngam, 2014). 
Transition and Summary 
Section 2 included discussions of the role of the researcher, the participants, 
population and sampling, data collection, data analysis, and ethical research 
consideration. In Section 3, I will document the research findings, analysis, and results. In 
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addition, Section 3 will include information on the application to business practice, 




Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore strategies to 
improve board selection criteria that banking leaders use to promote effective 
governance. Data collection involved my semistructured interviews with four business 
leaders who had a minimum of 3 years’ association with the bank and possessed 
knowledge on the selection criteria for board membership at the bank. Data included 
interview responses as well as publicly available archival documents with financial 
reports and business journals. I conducted a comprehensive analysis of this data, which 
involved examining and comparing the data from different sources (see Marshall & 
Rossman, 2016). This section will include (a) the presentation of the findings, (b) 
application to professional practice, (c) implications for social change, (d) 
recommendations for action, (e) recommendations for further research, (f) reflections, 
and (g) the conclusion. 
In this study, I explored board selection criteria that promoted corporate 
governance from the perspective of business leaders in a bank in California. The bank has 
experienced growth in its history. It did not have losses during the recent recession as the 
annual reports indicated increasing growth and the bank has had more than 100 
consecutive quarters of profitability. The financial and annual reports were available on 
the bank’s website under the investor and financial information link. 
90 
 
Presentation of the Findings  
The purpose of this study was to answer one overarching research question: What 
strategies do banking leaders use to identify board selection criteria to ensure effective 
governance? Four themes emerged from the participant responses and documents 
reviewed. The themes were: (a) select independent, experienced, and knowledgeable 
business leaders as board members; (b) recognize the importance of the choice of the 
CEO and other senior executives; (c) acknowledge cooperation is key to sustainable 
growth; and (d) promote integrity and ethics as key executive and board membership 
criteria. 
The participants in this study were four business leaders and board members of a 
California community bank. Two were executive vice presidents and two were board 
members. All the participants were knowledgeable about the bank’s board selection 
criteria. During the semistructured interviews, which all occurred by telephone and lasted 
for an average of 30 minutes, each participant answered a series of seven open-ended 
questions that I posed to them. Technology has enabled researchers to increase the reach 
of data collection via telephones (Lord et al., 2016). Telephone interviews are a genuine 
alternative to face-to-face interviews in that they offer greater anonymity and enable 
participants to control the privacy of the conversation (Irvine, Drew, & Sainsbury, 2013). 
The participants would not permit me to record the interviews. In the interviews, I 
asked probing questions, took extensive notes, read the answers provided to each 
question to each participant to verify the accuracy of my notes, and mailed a succinct 
synthesis to each participant to confirm the information captured. I coded the participants 
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using assigned codes P1 through P4. Participants P1 and P2 served as vice presidents and 
Participants P3 and P4 served as board members. I interpreted the resulting data with 
thematic analysis. Thematic analysis enables a researcher to identify important patterns 
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013). Recurring themes emerged in the secondary 
data  including publicly available archival documents with financial reports and business 
journals regarding the strategies that banking leaders use to identify board selection 
criteria to ensure effective governance. Recurring themes were (a) independence, (b) 
vigilance and ability to monitor management, (c) diversity, (d) financial knowledge, (e) 
separating the roles of CEO and board chair, (f) full-time board membership, (g) small 
board size, (h) term limits for board members, (i) age limit for board members, and (j) 
ethics. 
Key Words 
After undertaking the interviews, I compiled a list of recurring keywords in the 
responses. The word CEO was the most frequently used (f = 32), followed by executive (f 
= 31). These support a conclusion that the CEO and top executives are paramount to 
effective governance. All participants mentioned the importance of the partnership 
between the board and senior executives. According to P1, the partnership between the 
board and executives has been the key to the bank’s success. The keywords of experience 
(f = 19), leadership (f = 12), integrity (f = 11), knowledge (f = 10), and ethics (f = 5) 
revealed important criteria for board selection. Other keywords included monitor (f = 10), 
independent (f = 7), oversight (f = 4), and supervise (f = 4), which supported the 
important function of monitoring.  
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Theme 1: Select Independent, Experienced, and Knowledgeable Business Leaders as 
Board Members 
The first theme that emerged from the analysis was to select independent, 
experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members. I identified 
independence as part of the conceptual framework for this study. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), the primary role of the board is to monitor managerial performance 
due to the inherent conflict of interest between executives and shareholders. According to 
the nominating and corporate governance guidelines for the bank, dated February 2016, a 
principal goal of the board is to optimize independent perspectives, give advice to the 
CEO and management, increase the quality of board oversight, and lessen the possibility 
of conflicts of interest. 
Board members’ independence is an essential requirement for controlling 
management and protecting shareholder value (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). P1 noted that all 
the board members except the CEO are independent, and they review the knowledge and 
experience required due to vacancy and business needs. According to the nominating and 
corporate governance guidelines for the bank dated February 2016, board members seek 
a broad range of skills, expertise, industry knowledge, and contacts useful to the 
company’s business. Additionally, every interviewee (100%) noted that independence is 
a primary requirement for board membership and effective governance. P3 remarked that 
board members are entrusted with the strategic initiatives of the bank and held 
responsible for providing high-level oversight to the executive team. 
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Seven of the eight board members at the community bank are independent board 
members. A director is independent if no immediate family member is employed by the 
firm and they have not been an employee of the firm or auditing firm (Conyon, 2014). 
According to agency theory, board members should be able to monitor management, and 
because they are expected to monitor and guide executives, their independence is critical 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). P4 explained that board members are independent and have 
supervisory responsibilities over the executives of the bank. According to Nordberg and 
McNulty (2013), the primary responsibilities of board members are monitoring, external 
affiliation, and guidance. 
The experience and knowledge of the executive and board members are intended 
to promote governance while also guiding investments (Yuan et al., 2014). According to 
P2, the vacuum created on the board determines the criteria for the selection of new board 
members. All board members and the CEO are accomplished and have had strong 
leadership experience. According to the nominating and corporate governance guidelines 
for the bank, dated February 2016, all directors are expected to be knowledgeable about 
the company and its industry. P1 shared that business leadership is “top on the list” as 
board members utilize their insights and experience to advance shareholder value. 
According to agency theory, a small board is usually more efficient than a large 
board because of a decrease in agency conflicts, effective communication, and lower 
operation costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The bank has a small board with a total of 
eight board members. According to the nominating and corporate governance guidelines 
for the bank, dated February 2016, the board should be comprised of a sufficient number 
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of directors to enable the board to properly perform its responsibilities and achieve its 
governance objectives and goals. The company’s bylaws currently provide that the board 
will consist of between seven and 13 members. 
My findings around this theme confirmed the existing literature. Agency theory 
suggests that small boards are more efficient because they are better coordinated and 
have less internal conflicts (Switzer & Wang, 2013). According to the nominating and 
corporate governance guidelines, the board should be small enough to permit meaningful 
participation by each director, substantive discussions of the entire board, and large 
enough that committee work does not become unduly burdensome. Companies with 
smaller boards have lower agency costs (Garanina & Kaikova, 2016). As for board size, 
my findings were consistent with the major assumption: Companies with smaller boards 
have lower agency costs (Garanina & Kaikova, 2016).   
P3 explained that performance as directors and the board are evaluated annually 
as stipulated by the shareholders and an important performance criterion is promoting 
shareholder value. According to the nominating and corporate governance guidelines for 
the bank, dated February 2016, the board believes it is important to monitor overall board 
performance, to address changing needs of the company, and to bring fresh perspectives 
to the challenges facing the company as circumstances warrant. According to Form 10-K 
from the SEC’s (2017) EDGAR System, during 2016, the board of directors declared 
quarterly cash dividends. 
There is no CEO duality at the study site community bank as the CEO is not the 
chair of the board. Agency theorists have asserted that there is greater board 
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independence when the roles of CEO and chair of the board are separate (Sarpal, 2014). 
Board attendance decreases with multiple directorships (Lin et al., 2014). P2 expressed 
that nominees should not be currently serving on more than two other boards and must be 
capable of attending scheduled board and committee meetings. 
Theme 2: Recognize the Importance of the Choice of the CEO and Other Senior 
Executives 
Another theme that emerged from this study was that the choice of the CEO and 
other senior executives are critical to effective corporate governance. Most literature on 
corporate governance focused on the role of the board, duties, responsibilities, 
composition, structure, shareholder rights and activism, executive compensation, and 
diversity. The study site bank's corporate governance focuses on the board as well as 
senior executives. According to the bank's corporate governance guidelines, the 
compensation committee conducts an annual review of the president and CEO’s 
performance to ensure that the officers are providing the best leadership for the bank in 
the long and short-term. 
Board practices designed to achieve long-term utility are central to the 
prescription of agency theory to protect owners' interests (Conheady et al., 2015).  
Protection of shareholders’ interests is in line with the agency theory. There has been far 
less focus in research focus in the field on the importance of the CEO and other senior 
executives in corporate governance. In reality, corporate governance in banks involves 
the boards and senior executives both accountable to shareholders, who must collaborate 
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in providing strategic decision making, compliance with laws, and protection of 
depositors (Leventis et al., 2013). 
In my search within Walden University’s library using the term corporate 
governance on Business Source Complete with delimiters, the full text and peer-reviewed 
scholarly journals from 2013 to date, yielded more than 4,740 results. Boards and 
directors yielded 2,580 articles and chief executive officer and CEO as a subject term 
yielded 762 (see Table 1). Clearly, most articles have focused on board members (54%) 
as the most important factor in corporate governance. 
Table 1 







Many of the corporate governance problems in the past related to greed by 
executives, lapses in judgment, and executive discretion (i.e., Enron, Adelphia, 
WorldCom; Darrat et al., 2016). However, most researchers still focused on the board. 
Boards of directors complement the regulatory oversight of executives (Henderson, 
2013). The bank in this case study did not have full-time board members. As explained 
by Participant P2, “We do not have full-time board members, and it is inconceivable that 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Board 1436 30.0 
Directors 1144 24.0 
CEO 762 16.0 
Audit 473 10.0 
Regulations 925 20.0 
Total 4740 100.0 
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directors would be informed about all the issues that occur in real-time.” Corporate 
governance involves the executives of a firm, its board, its shareholders, and regulatory 
agencies (Dermine, 2013). 
The CEO is paramount regarding corporate governance. The collective behavior 
of corporate leaders is often critical in corporate wrongdoing, and the CEO frequently 
plays a central role (Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015). P3 noted that the daily operations of a 
bank are the responsibility of the executive management. This is further confirmed by 
existing literature. According to Starbuck (2014), it is important to improve executive 
management governance. 
Directors often face limited access to firm-specific information, and the high cost 
of assessing the reliability of information and these limitations reduce their monitoring 
effectiveness (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Nordberg and McNulty (2013), 
responsible boards of directors take ownership of their role and actively oversee activities 
in their firms. While this is important, the role of the CEO is paramount. CEOs have 
substantial influence in addition to the explicit legal authority to direct corporate affairs 
(Khanna et al., 2015). Business leaders, the board of directors, and audit committees must 
maintain the integrity and the public trust (Franzel, 2014). 
Theme 3: Acknowledge Cooperation is Key to Sustainable Growth 
The third theme was that cooperation, rather than strict monitoring, is the key to 
sustainable growth. This is confirmed by current literature. In light of past corporate 
scandals, companies are paying more attention to corporate governance practices, 
particularly aligning the interests of stakeholders and managers to minimize the exposure 
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to the principal-agent problem (Garanina & Kaikova, 2016). The participants’ claim that 
cooperation, rather than strict monitoring, is the key to sustainable growth disconfirms 
the main conceptual theory. P1 declared that “an effective board uses their knowledge 
and experience to complement the strategies by the CEO.” 
The agency theory demands sufficient monitoring to align agency interests (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). According to agency theory, candidates for board membership should 
be selected based on their ability to monitor management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
However, a recurring theme in the participant interview responses aligned with another 
governance theory, the stewardship theory. Under stewardship theory, the relationship 
between the board and CEO is cooperative with the board working collaboratively with 
the CEO (McNulty, Florakis et al., 2013). 
The participants emphasized that collaboration was key to the bank’s success.  
According to publicly available bank’s financial disclosures, the bank has demonstrated 
strong and sustained financial performance and positive earnings for more than 100 
consecutive quarters. Each participant commented that cooperation is the key to their 
sustained growth. According to P4, the majority of shareholders, the executive team, and 
the board are “on the same page,” as they “all work for and are accountable to the 
shareholders.” In addition, as noted in the nominating and corporate governance 
guidelines for the bank dated February, 2016, other important factors to be considered by 
the nominating committee in the selection of nominees for the position of a director 
include ability to work together as an effective group and the ability to commit adequate 
time to serve as a director. 
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The interview responses supported some assertions that the board may work 
cooperatively with the CEO when interests align in pursuance of shareholders’ goals.  
Stewardship theory affirms the synergies derivable between members of the board and 
CEO, which positively influence organizational performance (Mowbray & Ingley, 2013). 
According to the bank’s annual reports, the bank has sustained financial performance and 
delivered a cash dividend for more than 100 consecutive quarters. P2 emphasized that the 
board and CEO have demonstrated a strong focus on increasing long-term shareholder 
value. According to the bank's corporate governance guidelines, the board and CEO’s 
performance are assessed on both short and long-term outcomes. 
Theme 4: Promote Integrity and Ethics as Key Executive and Board Membership 
Criteria 
Board member selection criteria are important and include knowledge and 
experience (Elms et al., 2015). The CEO is not a member of the nominating committee of 
the bank. In the nominating and corporate governance guidelines for the bank dated 
February, 2016, the nominating committee shall be comprised of directors who qualify as 
independent directors. Integrity as a key executive and board membership is an important 
theme that emerged from this study. 
Some interviewees made statements that integrity was an important board 
selection criterion. According to P2, the articulation of the vision of putting people with 
integrity in executive positions to execute is indispensable to effective corporate 
governance and success for the bank. As stated in the nominating and corporate 
governance guidelines for the bank, another important factor to be considered by the 
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nominating committee in the selection of nominees for the position of director is 
community involvement. 
The importance of integrity was affirmed by P3, who shared that nominees 
selected to serve on the board have all demonstrated a reputation for honesty and 
adherence to high ethical standards. Unlike the inherent divergence of interests 
propounded by the agency problems which is the basis for shareholder calls for boards to 
implement effective governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Existing literature confirms 
this affirmation.  In the area of director selection, proven moral integrity could become a 
point to investigate before appointment as a director (Grant & McGhee, 2017). Board of 
directors must maintain integrity to uphold the capital market and economic well-being 
(Franzel, 2014). The integrity of the board is pivotal to fostering shareholder trust 
(Perrault, 2015).  
Pitelis (2013) asserted that there should be an ethical dimension in managing the 
affairs of the company. The ethical dimension and integrity are more aligned to the 
trusteeship theory. In trusteeship theory, executive management and board members 
behave transparently and conscientiously (Balasubramanian, 2009). The lack of integrity 
of some executive leaders relates to the conceptual theory for this study. The boards of 
directors are; therefore, empowered to monitor the CEO and protect shareholders’ 
interests. Knowledge in the discipline is considered in the selection of the appropriate 
directors to undertake this monitoring. 
The potential for opportunistic behavior and excessive risk taking by the CEO in 
organizations is a primary governance issue (Arce, 2013). Female directors enhance the 
101 
 
integrity of the board and promote shareholder trust (Perrault, 2015). Board diversity 
enhances the integration of different perspectives and allows for better decision making 
(Sun et al., 2015). Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012) argued that gender-diverse boards are 
tougher monitors of CEOs. In this case study, a gender diversity of the bank’s board was 
observed: two women and six men. However, no participant mentioned gender diversity 
as a selection criterion for board membership. 
Corporations with good governance, have boards that are morally accountable to 
shareholders (Nohel et al., 2014). P1 explained that “in addition to board membership, 
much depends on the quality of the CEO and chief financial officer (CFO).” According to 
the bank's corporate governance guidelines, Directors are expected to act ethically at all 
times and to acknowledge their adherence to the bank’s Code of Ethics. Encouragement 
can be taken from the field of ethical decision making in which studies have found that 
certain personal ethical values or value orientations are linked to ethical or unethical 
behavior in business (Grant & McGhee, 2017). 
The first theme that emerged from the analysis was to select independent, 
experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members. Khosa (2017) 
confirmed this finding, reporting that independent directors play a major role to stop 
unchecked discretion in an environment where agent–principal conflict exists. Another 
theme that emerged was that the choice of the CEO and other senior executives are 
critical to effective corporate governance. Zhang, Zhang, Jia, and Ren (2017) concurred 
with this finding, stating outside directors and influential CEOs greatly influence 
corporate governance and firm performance.  
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The third theme is that cooperation, rather than strict monitoring, is the key to 
sustainable growth. The decade starting in 2010 is often referred to as the shareholder 
spring, when a number of corporations, principally in the United States and United 
Kingdom found themselves at the receiving end of shareholder ire following the passing 
of the Dodd-Frank law (Subramanian, 2017). Congress created the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to rein in financial malfeasance; however, 
congress is rolling is back this legislation with the introduction of the Financial Choice 
Act (Fraser, 2017).  
The fourth theme is to promote integrity and ethics as key executive and board 
membership criteria. Studies in the field of decision making have found that personal 
ethical values or value orientations relate to ethical or unethical behavior in business 
(Grant & McGhee, 2017). Liborius (2017) confirmed this finding, reporting that 
leadership integrity refers to the consistency of a leader’s words and actions, which 
includes reliable, honest, and promise-keeping behavior and has significant outcomes for 
the organization in terms of performance, trust, satisfaction.  Van Esterik-Plasmeijer and 
van Raaij (2017) concurred with this finding, stating trust in banks and other financial 
institutions are crucial for the functioning of the banking system and for society at large 
and major determinants of trust are value congruence and integrity. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The findings, conclusions, and recommendations from this study may contribute 
to effective corporate governance in banks and corporations. Business leaders may utilize 
the results in the selection of board members and executive leaders to enhance corporate 
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governance. The four themes that emerged were: (a) select independent, experienced, and 
knowledgeable business leaders as board members; (b) recognize the importance of the 
choice of the CEO and other senior executives; (c) acknowledge cooperation is key to 
sustainable growth; and (d) promote integrity and ethics as key executive and board 
membership criteria. 
Banks are important as a source of finance for most businesses; consequently, 
strong corporate governance remains vital to the economy (Capriglione & Casalino, 
2014). The findings may help to solve the problem of corporate scandals and corporate 
greed that result in economic depression. By selecting independent board members, 
organizational leaders would be able to monitor the executives in firms where such 
monitoring is desirable. The selection of experienced business leaders to serve as board 
members is essential in enabling the board to have a good understanding of the many 
issues financial institutions face (i.e., primarily specialized and emerging issues such as 
cybersecurity, technology, legislation, and globalization). Experience and proven 
leadership are strategic advantages in the selection of board members. It is also important 
to select directors that have adequate time for their board duties. Busy and distracted 
directors may be ineffective and cause corporate governance (Lin et al., 2014). 
The findings may aid business leaders in revising selection criteria for the senior 
executives, including the CEO, CFO and chief legal officer. These senior executives 
monitor bank operations for misconduct and engage legal resources in advising the CEO 
and the board on compliance issues. Business knowledge and experience are important 
attributes in the selection of these executives. In addition, business leaders should use 
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selection criteria that put a premium on other attributes of enduring value. The board is 
the safeguard of the interests of the dispersed shareholders (Sur, Lvina, & Magnan, 
2013). The executives are wholly responsible to the shareholders. When the monitoring 
of executives is the prime focus of the board, the board is less effective as a partner in the 
growth of the corporation. Cooperation rather than strict monitoring is the key to 
sustainable growth. 
The findings may be relevant to improved business practice. Ineffective corporate 
governance was the primary cause of excessive managerial risk-taking in the financial 
sector and the financial crisis from 2007–2009. Business leaders should make integrity 
and ethics a key criterion for executive and board membership. Harp et al. (2014) 
concluded that regulatory compliance, with a strong ethical orientation, can lead to the 
selection of board members and executive leaders that demonstrate strong ethics and 
integrity‒this leads to improved corporate governance and performance. 
Implications for Social Change 
Implications for social change include encouraging business leaders to adopt 
board selection strategies that promote corporate governance. When board members and 
executive leaders who are experienced, knowledgeable, and ethical are engaged in a 
bank, the positive results are transmitted to many other businesses. A responsible hand at 
the helm of banking and financial corporation’s affairs may prevent corporate fraud, 
greed, and malfeasance that lead to failure, economic meltdown, and global recession. 
Ineffective corporate governance are the harbingers of the type of recession that 
the global economy experienced 2007 to 2009. Rather than leading to corporate failure, 
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and high unemployment, the success of financial institutions could promote the well-
being of many. The positive performance may result promote improved individual 
welfare and living standards for all corporate stakeholders. Effective corporate 
governance strategies may lead to protection of all stakeholders, including shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, and society as a whole (Bistrova et al., 2014). 
Recommendations for Action 
Business leaders may consider utilizing corporate governance in strategy 
formulation and execution by implementing the strategies discussed in the emerging 
themes of the study. When selecting board members, it is important to consider many 
factors. Volonte (2015) stated that corporate governance is crucial to financial 
performance. Ineffective corporate governance is a result of weak oversight (Dymski et 
al., 2013). To counter this, business leaders should select independent, experienced, and 
knowledgeable directors as board members. Directors have responsibilities to 
shareholders who have entrusted them to maximize their returns from their investments 
(Bilchitz & Jonas, 2016). 
Equally important is the selection criteria and choice of CEO and other senior 
executives. The executives are responsible for enhancing shareholder value and have 
responsibilities to their employees and customers as well. The knowledge and experience 
of the CEO and board members are intended to promote governance (Yuan et al., 2014).  
Business leaders should include governance consideration in their selection of executive 
leaders. Business leaders should ascertain that long-term and sustainable objectives are 
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the focus and to ensure alignment of goals and objectives from the start. It will also help 
if executive remuneration and evaluation are designed to align with shareholder interests. 
A recommendation is to utilize an incentive contract. An incentive contract is 
when a corporation attaches performance targets to equity grants (such as stock options) 
to strengthen the association between executive compensation and firm performance 
(Abernethy et al., 2015). This compensation method may help to further align 
shareholder interests with executive focus. In organizations with minimal agency 
problem, cooperation rather than strict monitoring is the key to sustainable growth. As 
recommended by Warren Buffett, performance should be the basis for executive pay and 
incentives (Bowen et al., 2014). 
Decision-making by directors should not only focus on short-term financial 
results but also the importance of building longer-term relationships and involves striking 
a balance between the competing interests of different stakeholders to benefit the 
shareholders in the long term (Bilchitz & Jonas, 2016). Business leaders should make 
integrity a key executive and board membership criterion. A greater emphasis on ethics is 
needed to enhance corporate governance practice (Grant & McGhee, 2017). 
Business leaders should be encouraged to pay attention to the results of this study.  
I will continue research on related topics. I will publish excerpts from this study and write 
articles for publication in professional journals on effective corporate governance. I may 
also present the results from this study as best practice in corporate training, conferences 
and at seminars. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
In Section 1, I noted that a limitation of this study was the honesty of the 
participants in discussing the board selection criteria of their bank. I mitigated this 
limitation by asking open-ended questions. Open-ended research questions facilitate the 
gathering comprehensive responses (Starr, 2014). I also allowed participants to answer 
without interruption and asked the same interview and follow-up questions. In future 
research, reproducing the study with other banks and other financial institutions may 
support the results or add to the knowledge obtained from this study. 
Another limitation identified was the degree of forthrightness and candor of my 
participants in identifying and discussing all the effective corporate governance practices 
and strategies that have been critical to preventing corporate crises and resulting in the 
success of the bank. I mitigated this by engaging in telephone interviews. According to 
Lord et al., (2016) telephone interviews promote forthrightness. Future researchers 
should consider reproducing the study with a larger sample size to increase the 
probability of complete forthrightness and candor. 
Another limitation that I identified was that banks were different in size and 
market capitalization and that the bank I had selected may not be representative of most 
banks. To mitigate this, I chose a medium-sized bank for my single case study. Future 
researchers should consider reproducing the study with both larger and smaller banks and 
other financial institutions. 
Exploring the strategies that banking leaders use to identify board selection 
criteria to ensure effective governance led to the emergence of some themes that future 
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researchers may pursue. I designed the study to focus on one medium-sized bank, which 
is not representative of all types of banks. Future researchers may wish to undertake 
similar studies in small and large banks. In addition, future researchers may resist 
yielding to assumptions in undertaking their research. One assumption of this study was 
that bank boards are critical to effective corporate governance. It may be prudent to ask 
what the leaders find important toward effective corporate governance. 
It would be worthwhile to undertake additional research on the utility of engaging 
full-time board members. Directors are important as checks and balances and uphold 
shareholder interests. Directors have the fiduciary duty of loyalty and must put the 
company’s interests first. Researchers may consider exploring whether serving as a full-
time director in only one organization would improve attendance at meetings, increase 
industry and firm-specific knowledge; higher engagement in the firm’s affairs may 
translate to improved corporate governance and performance. 
It is important to examine the effect of corporate governance in a firm with 
significant agency issues when the CEO who serves on the board and is a member of the 
nominating committee. Making the board of directors, their compensation, and 
nominating committees more independent and accountable is important for governance 
(Conyon, 2014). According to Lixiong and Masulis (2015), the composition of the 
nominating committee could affect not only the composition of the entire board but also 
the independence of directors, and ultimately, the quality of board oversight. The 
nominating committee is responsible for new director nominations for election at the 
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annual meetings, and the committee is also usually responsible for evaluating individual 
director performance and approving their re-nominations (Lixiong & Masulis, 2015). 
Of utmost importance is the need for future research on selection strategies for 
chief executive officers. It may be beneficial to undertake further research on viable 
methods and best practices to measure the integrity of prospective CEO’s and board 
members. A study which examines existing methods and good practices that have been 
successful in selecting strong ethical leaders with integrity could improve business 
practice and performance. 
Reflections 
Most business entities and large segments of the population are affected by the 
state of the economy, especially a severe worldwide recession that lasts for years and 
leads to chronic unemployment. The questions arise as to who were those responsible, 
what is the business process in which business leaders are held accountable, and what are 
the criteria for selecting such leaders? If those responsible include business leaders, then 
selecting the best leaders is imperative toward preventing future corporate crisis and 
economic depression. There is the continuing need to study best practices when selecting 
business leaders that promote and maintain effective corporate governance? 
This doctoral study began as a quantitative multiple regression study. The 
independent variables were (a) the independence of the board represented by the number 
of outside directors; (b) gender diversity of the board, as measured by female board 
members; and (c) the dual role of CEO/board chair measured by whether the CEO is also 
the board chair. The dependent variable was corporate financial performance measured 
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by net profit margin. A qualitative method later emerged as the best approach for this 
study. The research study is of importance to most business concerns. The study was 
designed to focus on effective corporate governance and the important role of directors of 
corporate boards in banks. The research was designed to uncover the selection criteria 
that was used by a successful bank for effective corporate governance. 
I was prepared to learn about and articulate factors such as the importance of 
educational attainment, demographic diversity, independence, democratic director 
selection methods, and so on, but was surprised to discover that the most important 
determinant of corporate governance was the choice of an experienced, knowledgeable, 
and ethical CEO with integrity. I have a greater appreciation that effective corporate 
governance is achievable when the enduring interests of shareholders, board members, 
and senior executives are aligned, and the appropriate strategies are designed and 
executed. 
Conclusion 
Effective corporate governance is essential to banks and businesses. For effective 
corporate governance, firms must ensure that the interests of the shareholders and the 
executives are aligned and minimize agency issues. The agency issues in different banks 
and corporations are not the same. While some corporations may experience significant 
difference and misalignment in the motivations of the CEO and shareholders, others may 
not have significant agency issues. In some organizations, board members capable of 
effective monitoring are desirable. In the other organizations, monitoring is not the 
primary focus, but cooperation is the key to sustainable growth.  
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Four themes emerged from this study. The themes were (a) select independent, 
experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members; recognize the 
importance of the choice of the CEO and other senior executives; acknowledge 
cooperation is key to sustainable growth; and promote integrity and ethics as key 
executive and board membership criteria. The findings may aid business leaders in 
formulating and executing effective corporate governance strategies.  
Our social well-being depends in part on our economic well-being. Our nation’s 
economic well-being and corporate success is a determinant of how our government may 
fulfill its many obligations and our prosperity. Our prosperity hinges upon sustainable 
practices of businesses and their performance and is reliant on effective corporate 
governance. Identifying and proposing board member selection criteria may improve 
corporate governance, which could result in better business practices and performance.  
Corporate governance that enhances longer-term shareholders and stakeholder interests 
are desirable and in the interests of business professionals, employees, customers, 
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study about effective corporate 
governance in United States banks. The study is in partial fulfillment of the degree of 
Doctor of Business Administration by the researcher, Oladayo Ojo, a doctoral student 
attending Walden University. The intent is to gather insights from some board members, 
members of the nominating committee and knowledgeable executives on the overarching 
research question: What strategies do banking leaders use to identify board selection 
criteria to ensure effective governance? 
The interview would span between 25-35 minutes and scheduled at your 
convenience. The doctoral study would not feature individual or company name and used 
for the research study only. I would provide you with a copy of the interview transcript to 
verify the accuracy before inclusion in my research paper. This research could make a 
difference by fostering business success when board members are selected for enduring 
characteristics that enhance corporate governance. I would send additional information 
on the background of the study, informed consent and confidentiality before the 
interview. I would appreciate your response on whether you would participate, decline or 
for additional information. Thank you very much.  
Respectfully,  







Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Date: __________________________   
Interviewer: ____________________  
Respondent: ____________________ 
1. Identify myself and set the respondent at ease. 
2.  Provide background information regarding the study. 
3. Explain the purpose of the study and the research question. 
4. Explain the consent form: assure respondent of privacy and 
confidentiality. 
5.  Ask to record the interview or take notes as the respondent speaks. 
6.  Ask the interview questions using assigned code P1 through P4. 
7. Ask follow-up questions. 
8.  Thank the interviewee. 
9.  Explain member checking procedure. 
10.  Conclude the interview. 
 
